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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
he asset management industry encompasses a broad range of businesses, in terms both
of size as well as regulatory regimes. In terms of volume, the importance of the industry
differs remarkably across jurisdictions, and is influenced by the wealth and savings
behaviour of citizens, the existence and maturity of funded occupational pension schemes and
the domestic regulatory environment. No less than five different legislative regimes govern
asset management in the EU: banking, investment services, insurance, pension funds and
investment funds. The purpose of this Task Force was to assess the adequacy of the current
regulatory framework and the consistency of rules across sectors, most importantly from a
capital adequacy and asset allocation perspective, to determine whether further regulatory
action was necessary to advance market integration.
The findings of the Task Force are as follows:
•  There is no need for a horizontal asset management directive to supersede the current
directives.  The recent agreement on two new investment fund directives – UCITS
(undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities) II & III – and the pension
funds directive (provisional) are important steps towards a more integrated European
market for asset management, with a truly single passport. The choice of asset management
regime has been extended to include discretionary asset management as an option for
UCITS management companies (in the UCITS III) and for the application of the prudent
man rule of the pension funds directive to the pension fund business of life insurance
companies.
•  The key issue, in the spirit of the Lamfalussy report, is to focus on level 2 and 3 issues to
ensure adequate cooperation between European supervisory authorities so as to guarantee
consistent implementation and a harmonised approach in secondary legislation and in
supervisory practices. Both the UCITS and pension funds directives require a Lamfalussy-
style approach for implementation of legislation at levels 2 and 3, which is not yet in place.
The UCITS Committee has only limited implementing powers and is not formally part of
the Securities Committee/Committee of European Securities Regulators structure, which
should ensure harmonised implementation. The Insurance Committee will need to be
upgraded to cover the secondary legislation of the pension funds directive, and will need a
second level to review harmonised implementation.
•  The amended investment services directive may become the most open of the asset
management directives, with harmonised conduct-of-business rules.  The new UCITS
directive is probably the easiest one, with a low capital requirement, and the option of
discretionary asset management. Much also  depends,  however,  on the extent of the
application of the operational risk charge in the context of the New Basel Capital Accord,
which may apply to both regimes. Compared to other lines of business, losses resulting
from operational risk in the asset management industry have been limited so far, and these
can be covered by private insurance. It should also be remembered that US investment
fund companies are not subject to capital requirements and that US broker-dealers will not
be subject to the Basel Accord.
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The key outstanding issue on which much work remains to be done is taxation. The current
taxation system operates along national lines and cases of overt tax discrimination hamper pan-
European asset management. It increases the cost of asset management and reduces returns to
investors as national tax rules lead to the duplication of fund structures. In addition, the wide
differences in taxation between countries makes cross-border investment more difficult.
Moreover, there are wide variations between countries regarding compensation for taxes paid
abroad, with some countries providing credit for such payments while others do not. Finally,
little effective relief is in place at the investor level for taxes incurred at the fund level. The
reason is that double-taxation treaties do not effectively work for investors, and funds are, in
most cases, excluded from those treaties. This situation ought to be corrected.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) should be supported in its efforts to eliminate restrictions
to the freedoms of movement in the internal market. The Commission should initiate more
infringement cases and industry should assist the Commission by bringing restrictive practices
to its attention or by initiating cases themselves. As a complement to the case-by-case action of
the ECJ, attempts should be made to further the convergence of tax systems, e.g. the taxation of
pensions (having a single system for contributions to and pay-outs by funds) or in the field of
corporate taxation (where the Commission is promoting convergence in the method of
computing tax bases).
Member states are concerned to see their citizens’ savings placed abroad and hence beyond
their tax powers. In response, member states often resort to tax and other measures that
discourage citizens from placing savings with foreign service providers. If such measures
discriminate between service providers on grounds of nationality, they violate EU law, as
evidenced by several decisions of the ECJ. Court action takes time, however, and may not be
sufficient to dismantle all such discriminatory measures. As a supplement to Court action,
achieving further convergence in the way member states tax fund management and reaching a
consensus on how to tax non-residents’ savings income may reduce the underlying reason why
member states resort to such practices in the first place. The combination of convergence and
consensus may therefore contribute to the reduction of discriminatory tax practices.1
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INTRODUCTION
ow that economic and monetary union (EMU) has been in place for some four years, it
is a good time to make a first evaluation of its impact on European capital markets and
to identify areas for future policy action. Before EMU, it was commonly assumed that
the single currency would fundamentally alter the nature of several businesses, in particular the
asset management industry. It was thought that the irrevocable fixing of currency rates and the
expected reconfiguration in European capital markets would change the way in which the asset
management industry acted in these markets.
The transformation of European capital markets has indeed happened, and the process is still
going on. It has been the most rapid in the short-term end, i.e. in the money markets, followed
by government bond markets, while the consolidation of European equity and derivatives
markets is still in progress. The different markets are becoming truly European, compared to
the nationally segmented markets that existed in the past.
The asset management industry on the other hand has probably not yet become as European as
was originally anticipated. While structural factors play an important role, it is now widely
assumed that the pace of convergence will be slower than expected. Regulatory, tax, language
and cultural differences continue to provide a domestic focus and bias to investors. Not all of
these issues can be solved by policy action, but some can. It is the latter on which this report
focuses.
This report starts with a brief discussion of the fundamentals of the asset management industry,
followed by an overview of developments in European capital markets and in the asset
management industry in recent years. It then goes on to discuss the EU regulatory environment
for asset management and the changes that have occurred in recent years. A final chapter
addresses the barriers resulting from variations in taxation. A glossary of EU directives and
acronyms referred to in this report can be found in Annex 3.
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CHAPTER 1
SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF ASSET MANAGEMENT
sset management is the generic term used to refer to the investment of funds of
institutional investors in capital markets. Asset management can be executed by
institutional investors themselves, or the function can be delegated to specialised
intermediaries.
The process of asset management is composed of different elements that can be divided into
front- and back-office tasks.
1
Front-office tasks include:
•  marketing, and the development of new products; and
•  fund management (asset allocation and risk management), research, trading and cash
management (deposits and cash).
Back-office tasks include:
•  transaction processing, settlement, custody, stock lending;
•  systems support;
•  accounting and administration (client support, performance analysis, etc.); and
•  general administration and management (legal, human resources, etc.).
These descriptions already show that it is possible for different industrial organisations to
operate in widely divergent manners in asset management. Firms may choose to be vertically
integrated and execute the full chain of tasks in-house; others may specialise in parts of the
process, both front as well as back-office tasks. The degree of integration differs across regions
and sectors, with continental Europe traditionally being more vertically integrated than the UK
and the US, for example, or the insurance industry more than mutual and pension funds.
The growing tendency to outsource parts of the process to other firms is related to the rapid
development and globalisation of financial markets, technological change, increasing
competition and the changing views on the organisation of the sector. Economies of scope and
scale were seen as key factors in a vertically integrated model, with high degrees of
concentration and oligopolies, and thus barriers to entry. Today, there is no single dominant
model in the industry. While there has been a further increase in the size of the asset
management industry, specialised players have emerged such as fund advisers and technology
consultants, while big players have started to specialise in one aspect of the process, such as
fund marketing, asset management or custody. Overall, the contestability of markets has
increased.
The asset management industry can also be divided into wholesale and retail sectors. The
former can be further subdivided into generic, specialised and balanced asset management, in
the order of increasing degrees of discretion on the side of the manager. Retail comprises
private banking, private fund management and the like. It can best be seen as a set of contracts
between various parties providing a set of services. Increased costs, notably for medium-sized
firms, and increased competition due to cross-border entry and the shift from active to passive
management are a few of the factors creating pressure for change in wholesale management.
On the retail side, similar pressure is exerted by increased competition from direct investor
holdings and exchange-traded funds, as well as the cost of gathering assets. Industry
                                                
1 The following is based upon Davis and Steil (2001).
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concentration has resulted as a response to these developments. At EU level, the adoption of
the EU passport directives, the increasing  professionalisation in asset management, and a
strong drive towards international investment have also contributed to change.
The key competitive factors in the asset management industry are performance and reputation,
according to a survey of firms discussed in the Task Force (see Davis and Steil, 2001, p. 205
ff.). Within a sample of 72 mainly Anglo-Saxon firms, which collectively managed almost $2
trillion in assets, the following factors were flagged:
•  Performance of asset managers relative to other institutions,  as well as reputation with
consultants and advisors, are considered as the key elements in the competitive process.
•  Existing firms’ reputation and relationships with clients, distribution channels and selling
networks were considered as the main entry barriers in domestic and foreign markets.
•  Greater name recognition and lower average operational costs were identified as the main
benefits of large size for asset managers.
•  Market impact of large transactions were seen as the main cost  to large-size asset
managers.
•  Domestic and cross-border integration of the fund management industry was expected to
continue, reshaping the current industry structure. Greater participation by banking
institutions in asset management was also foreseen.
A large body of academic literature exists on the theory of optimal asset allocation and the
difference with empirical evidence. Modern portfolio theory suggests that investors should
have internationally diversified portfolios to improve the reward-to-risk ratio of their asset
holdings. The attractiveness of international diversification is mostly due to low levels of
correlation among national markets. Studies point out however that portfolios are not optimally
diversified and that the cost in terms of lower returns and higher risk is large.
Two examples of recent studies should be sufficient to illustrate the divergence between
optimal and effective allocation. Comparing risk and return of various equity portfolios for
European investors for the period January 1978 to June 2001, Schröder (2002) found that, for a
British investor, holding an optimal portfolio of 80% non-domestic assets instead of a portfolio
of 20% non-domestic assets would yield an excess return of 2.2% per year. For a German
investor, holding this optimal portfolio (which is 100%  of the global allocation) instead of
about 20% would, in foreign assets, yield an excess return of 3% per year. For a French
investor, on the other hand, the optimal portfolio is near to the current portfolio allocation of
70% domestic French equities, so the gain from additional diversification is small. Lewis
(1999) shows that, following the minimum variance portfolio strategy for the US, investors
should allocate about 40% to non-US assets, rather than the 10% that is actually invested in
non-US equity. By not following this strategy, the US investor gives up about 50 basis points
per year in return (while also decreasing risk), or 80 basis points per year with no change in
risk.
2
Scholars have tried to find reasons for this home bias in asset allocation, and have come up
with different possible explanations. Transaction costs partially explain the bias, but not fully
(Mann and Meade, 2002). Other factors come into play, such as market risk, agency costs,
political uncertainty, regulatory differences and impediments (such as accounting standards
and taxation, which favour local as compared to foreign investments) and, probably most
importantly, exchange rate volatility. The latter is most commonly used to explain investors’
resistance to international diversification. In the European context, exchange rate risk has been
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eliminated within EMU, and should largely ease EMU-wide diversification. At the same time,
however, monetary union has reduced the benefits of diversification at  the European level,
since risk correlation between the different EMU members has increased.
Initial results from examining the effects of EMU on portfolio diversification in equity markets
found that the correlation between countries has indeed increased as has, but to a more limited
extent, the correlation between sectors. These findings support the view that a  sectoral
investment strategy prevails in EMU. Since country risk has a higher correlation than sectoral
risk, investments are best spread along sectoral lines in EMU. Overall, the impact of EMU on
optimal portfolio allocation was seen to be less important than its contribution to reducing the
effective and psychological obstacles to diversification within the euro area. Some barriers
disappeared the day the euro was introduced and others are decreasing as a result of dynamic
effects that have been set into motion. Currency risk may thus be more important because of its
role in strengthening the home bias than because of its impact on optimal investment strategies
(Danthine et al., 1999, p. 83). The future should indicate to what extent currency is a more
important factor in explaining home bias than other elements, which, in EMU, continue to
differ along national lines.5
CHAPTER 2
THE EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY
he asset management industry comprises all forms of collective (institutionalised) and
individual (discretionary) investment of savings by financial institutions for third parties
in money and capital markets. The group is difficult to define by size as it encompasses
far more than simply institutional investors (i.e. insurance companies, investment and pension
funds). European banks also provide asset management services. The extent to which  these
activities are separately licensed  will be reflected in the statistics. But i ndividual asset
management, such as private banking, is not considered as a separate legal entity from other,
more traditional banking activities. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at an
overall size estimation of the industry. It should furthermore be kept in mind that there may be
double counting in institutional investor data, as investment funds may be held by pension
funds and insurance companies.
The relative importance of the asset management industry from one country to another depends
on broader regulatory frameworks. The ways in which retirement plans are financed are crucial
in explaining the large differences in pension fund size,  as well as in the role of investment
funds. Most European countries still have no pension funds of any significance, since pensions
are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the high level of replacement ratios in the official
pension discourages the formation of additional privately-sponsored funded pension plans (2nd
pillar or occupational pensions). The absence of a well developed 2nd pillar pension also
explains the importance in some countries of other forms of organised savings, such as
investment funds. These can be categorised as individual retirement savings (3rd pillar). As
discussions on the EU savings tax have indicated, bank secrecy and the taxation of savings
income also play a role as explanatory factors.
In volume terms, insurance companies are the most important group of institutional investors.
They hold a total asset value, in percentage of GDP, of 54.4% in the EU (2000, see Table 5),
compared to investment funds of 40.6% and pension funds of 29.2%. In the US, the order of
importance is the reverse, with pension funds and investment funds being the largest (90.6%
and 69.7% of GDP respectively), and insurance companies the least substantial (34.9% of GDP
in 2000).
In relative terms, there are remarkable cross-country differences, with southern EU countries
having a much smaller insurance sector than found in the north. Pension funds are only of real
importance in a few EU countries: the Netherlands, the UK and, to a lesser extent, Sweden and
Ireland. Over time, the investment funds sector showed the strongest growth, expanding from
€1,171 billion in 1995 to €3,448.8 billion in 2000. Pension funds grew from €1,188 billion in
1995 to €2,484.4 billion in 2000 (see Annex 2). Investment funds have thus become much
more important in asset terms than pension funds.
Over the following pages, an overview is given of the total asset size and allocation of
traditional institutional investors, insurance companies, pension funds and investment funds.
By way of comparison, reference is also made to total asset size of banks, although no
aggregated breakdown exists of their asset management activities.
2.1 Insurance companies and pension funds
Both insurance companies and pension funds have witnessed mitigated growth within the EU.
Insurance companies recorded an average annual growth of 13% between 1995 and 1999,
decreasing to 7% in 2000. Likewise, pension assets were estimated at €2400.8 million in 1999
compared to €1189 million in 1995. This corresponds to an average annual growth of 14%, but
it went down to only 3% in 2000 (see Table 4).
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The development of the global insurance industry over the past five years was largely
attributable to a steady average annual growth of 15% in the life insurance business (slowing
down however to 6.6% in 2000). The non-life insurance business experienced an average
growth of 12% over the same period, decreasing to 0.4% in 2000 (see Table A2 in Annex 2).
The investment behaviour of pension funds and insurance companies shows more similarities
across countries than across sectors. Pension funds and insurance companies in English-
speaking countries traditionally invested the major part of their assets in equity while those in
continental European countries invested the largest part in fixed income. These differences
have become less pronounced recently, but they remain clearly noticeable. In Germany,
France, Portugal and Italy, data on the distribution of insurance company assets, including life
and non-life businesses, indicate an average investment of 60% in domestic fixed income and
almost 35% in equity (see Table 1). This compares with 28% for domestic fixed income and
56% for equity in the UK and Ireland. The difference is even more pronounced for pension
funds (see Table 2).
Table 1. Asset allocation of insurance companies
1 (%, 2000)
Equity
2 Fixed income
3 Real estate
4 Others
B 35.3 59.1 3.0 2.7
DK 42.4 49.8 2.8 5.0
D 36.0 60.5 3.1 0.4
EL 24.5 70.4 5.1 0.0
E 6.7 71.5 4.9 17.0
F 30.3 63.9 4.7 1.1
IRL 56.5 26.1 8.2 9.2
I 19.4 50.1 3.4 27.1
L 44.1 54.3 0.3 1.3
NL 33.4 54.6 5.2 6.8
A 34.0 55.0 7.0 4.0
P 20.4 63.3 5.3 11.0
FIN 36.0 52.9 11.0 0.1
S 51.7 43.0 4.9 0.5
UK 56.8 28.8 5.6 8.9
EU-15 41.9 47.5 4.7 5.9
CH 27.8 57.4 8.8 6.1
1 Total assets include non-life investments.
2 Variable yield securities and units in investment funds and investments in affiliated undertakings.
3 Including debt securities and other fixed income securities and loans including loans guaranteed and deposits with
credit institutions.
4 Land, buildings and participating interests.
Source: CEA (2002).
Asset allocation is often determined more by country-specific patterns than by investment
restrictions. German pension funds ( pensionskasse), for example, used to invest far less in
equity than allowed by law (less than 10%). This phenomenon could also be observed in thePAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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past in the Netherlands, which had no quantitative restrictions on pension fund investments.
This situation changed considerably, however, over the second half of the 1990s.
Table 2. Asset structure of pension funds (%, 2000)
Countries Equity Fixed income Real estate
Cash & short
term invest.
Other
Unallocated
assets
B 49.9 40.4 3.9 4.3 1.7 0.0
DK 32.4 47.9 4.4 1.7 13.7 0.0
D 6.6 12.7 1.2 0.3 0.0 79.3
EL 12.2 54.6 7.7 25.5 0.0 0.0
E 12.5 36.1 2.7 11.1 7.2 30.4
F 14.8 34.7 4.0 1.3 1.1 44.0
IRL 64.4 22.1 6.6 4.5 2.4 0.0
I 4.9 30.6 10.9 1.0 29.8 22.8
L 27.4 48.5 0.2 23.8 0.0 0.0
NL 42.0 47.0 10.1 0.9 0.0 0.0
A 9.7 19.4 0.3 1.3 1.6 67.6
P 29.3 48.4 7.3 11.0 3.9 0.0
FIN 39.0 38.1 13.6 9.3 0.0 0.0
S 34.0 42.2 6.2 0.6 0.1 16.9
UK 71.0 21.0 3.0 5.0 0.0 0.0
EU-15 47.8 27.0 4.4 3.2 0.8 16.8
CH 25.4 47.8 13.2 9.2 4.5 0.0
Source: Data from the website of EFRP (www.efrp.org).
Differences in pension fund asset structure may also be determined by country differences in
pension schemes. In Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and, to a lesser extent, the US, defined
benefit schemes for pension plans were in operation, whereby the employee’s pension  was
based on a percentage of his or her final salary. Other continental European countries relied
more heavily on defined contribution schemes, whereby accumulated contributions constitute
the final pension. Defined benefit schemes promise a pension based upon the last years of
salary. This can result in an actuarial deficit since the value of the pension is not directly
related to the contributions of the employee. Such schemes, however, induced fund managers
to take higher risks to cover future liabilities and thus invest a higher proportion in shares,
which gave better returns over the long term.
3 Most defined benefit schemes have been
trimmed down gradually in the private sector, although they continue to be in use in the public
                                                
3 It is too early to say whether the sharp downturn in the equity markets of the past two years will change
this assessment. The longer term here refers to 30 years. In the US, the equity market has generated an
annual return of 7.1% since World War II, compared to 1.3% for bonds and 0.6% for short-term paper.
Research on the French market has shown that a gain of 100% can be realised with stocks if they are
held for 30 years (Jean-Paul Betbèze, Le Monde, 1 October 2002). More recent research has indicated
that bonds have outperformed stocks since 1987 (Financial Times, 17 February 2003).PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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sector. Several of these are said to be under-funded today, and huge problems may emerge if
the slump in equity markets continues.
Over the last decade, pension fund and insurance sector  margins have gradually decreased,
with several firms becoming under-funded. Compared to the mid-1990s, when life insurers
worked with average gross investment returns of 8.4%, returns have come down to 4.9% in
2001.  The overall pay-out to policyholders  however  has stayed at a minimum of 3.5%,
implying that net returns have decreased from 4.9% to 1.4%.
4 The reason for this is the
continuing decline of interest rates in Europe, the recent fall in equity markets and high levels
of default on corporate bonds. As indicated above, insurers and pension funds have gradually
increased their investment in stock over the course of the 1990s, but the combination of low
government bond rates and a continuous slump in equity markets have left many in poor shape.
Moreover, guaranteed yields to policyholders are often set by law and do not change as rapidly
as market circumstances deteriorate. Insurers have traditionally focused on the liability risk
rather than the asset risk, which is also embedded in regulation.
2.2 Investment funds
The UCITS directive, adopted in 1985, has been successful in contributing to the growth of
investment funds within the EU. UCITS (undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities) are established in all member states and their total asset value totalled almost 41%
of EU GDP by the end of 2000. Between 1995 and 2000, the sector recorded an annual asset
growth rate of more than 20%. Geographically, investment funds are most important in France,
Italy and Spain, with the highest incidence occurring in Luxembourg. In Italy, Luxembourg
and Spain, investment funds are more important in asset terms than insurance companies, while
they are of comparable importance in France.
The most significant element of UCITS growth within the EU were equity funds which grew
considerably to reach 45.1% of total asset spread in the sector by the end of 2000, compared to
25% in 1995 (see Figure A2 in Annex 2). This remarkable growth in equity funds began to
slow down considerably in 2001 to reach 40.4%, substituted by a slight growth in bond and
money market funds. The growth of equity funds over the second half of the 1990s is related
not only to new net cash flow in funds, but also to the strong growth of major equity price
indices pushing up the value of equity investments. This trend is accompanied by a rise in the
supply of both pan-European and global equity funds. Indeed, data from FEFSI (Federation of
European Securities Exchanges) have demonstrated an internationalisation process of equity
fund portfolios in Europe since 1999. European equity funds  invested mainly in domestic
shares have dropped from 66% in 1992 to 38% in 2001. As such, equity funds have been
important contributors to the integration of European capital markets (see Delbecque, 2002).
Growth in mixed asset funds has also been remarkable, suggesting that fund investors seemed
to find a suitable risk-return balance in these types of funds. As far as bond funds are
concerned, a slow growth was noted against  a backdrop of declining interest rates. This
affected to an even greater extent the share of assets invested in money market funds, which
stagnated in volume terms but more than halved proportionally compared to other funds.
                                                
4 Data based on presentation by Steinar Bye and Lieve Lowet, of McKinsey and Company, to the Task
Force; see also McKinsey (2001).PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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Table 3. Investment funds asset spread in the EU (in billions of euro and as % of total, 2001)
Total
4 Equity
funds %
Bond
funds %
Mixed
funds %
Money
market %
B
1 77.0 46.3 60.1 10.6 13.7 18.9 24.6 1.3 1.7
DK 38.0 17.1 45.1 19.0 49.9 1.9 4.9 0.0 0.1
D 239.7 124.6 52.0 60.1 25.1 20.6 8.6 34.4 14.3
EL 26.8 5.5 20.4 5.6 20.9 6.0 22.6 9.7 36.2
E 177.9 49.2 27.6 53.2 29.9 31.7 17.8 43.8 24.7
F 800.2 206.8 25.8 138.7 17.3 197.0 24.6 257.7 32.2
IRL
2 215.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
I 403.7 110.6 27.4 158.9 39.4 87.5 21.7 46.7 11.6
L 851.1 318.2 37.4 328.2 38.6 113.5 13.3 91.2 10.7
NL 88.8 48.2 54.3 23.1 26.0 17.5 19.7 0.0
A 61.9 12.6 20.4 39.3 63.5 9.1 14.6 0.9 1.4
P 18.6 2.2 12.0 7.0 37.7 1.8 9.4 7.6 40.9
FIN 14.5 6.2 42.7 2.2 14.9 3.1 21.5 3.0 20.9
S 73.6 52.4 71.3 3.7 5.1 13.5 18.3 3.9 5.3
UK 389.4 309.3 79.4 42.1 10.8 36.4 9.3 1.7 0.4
EU-12 2760.2 930.4 33.7 826.8 30.0 506.7 18.4 496.3 18.0
EU-15 3476.3 1309.2 40.1 891.5 27.3 558.4 17.1 502.0 15.4
CH 84.9 39.2 46.2 16.7 19.7 23.5 27.6 5.5 6.5
US 7914.4 3878.6 49.0 1049.7 13.3 393.0 5.0 2593.2 32.8
JP
3 390.2 128.5 32.9 195.2 50.0 0.0 0.0 66.6 17.1
1 Mixed funds include 10 pension-saving funds with total net assets of €7.4 billion.
2 Total of sectoral funds exclude Ireland, for which no breakdown by type of funds is available.
3 Japanese equity funds include mixed funds.
4 The total also includes publicly offered open-ended funds investing in transferable securities and money market
funds. Real-estate funds, institutional funds, close-ended funds and hedge funds are excluded. The total net assets of
these funds amounted to €916 billion at the end of 2001 in the EU.
Source: Data taken from the website of FEFSI (www.fefsi.org).
As can be deduced from the data in Table 3, it is difficult to draw general observations
regarding the importance of  different types of funds across the EU. A common European
investment attitude or regional pattern is not in place. Rather, the ranking in importance of
different forms of funds seems to be based on country-specific reasons. In 2001, equity funds
were the most important fund vehicle in the UK, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands. Bond
funds were most important in Austria, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg and money market
funds in Portugal, Greece and France. In general, the split may reflect differences in the
investment behaviour of other institutional investors, as investment funds are also held by other
institutional investors. To the extent that investment funds are held by individual citizens, it
reflects the large differences in investment behaviour across countries.
Continuing pronounced differences in investment behaviour across countries reveal that a pan-
European fund marketing strategy would be difficult. A closer look reveals that,PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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notwithstanding the existence of a single regulatory regime in the UCITS directive, the market
is far from unified. This is obvious from the fact that the EU has three times as many registered
funds as the US (by end 2000, the EU had 24,716 funds under management, as compared to
8,171 in the US). The average fund size in the EU is one-fifth of that found in the US (€176
million as compared to €910 million in March 2001). Although funds are sold on a cross-
border basis in the EU, foreign entry is low in the large EU markets (Heinemann and Jopp,
2002). Funds are often developed in another jurisdiction, such as Luxembourg or Dublin, to be
sold back on the home market (“round trip”). This is also done for regulatory reasons and is
part of a trend towards specialisation among financial centres.
Knowing that scale matters in asset management, this pronounced market fragmentation
impacts on average costs. In the US market, a negative correlation was found between fund
size and fund costs – the average cost declining from 1.25% for a $51-200 million assets fund
to 0.87% for a $1 billion fund. Applying the same methodology, a recent study estimated that
the cost of fragmentation in the EU market was about €3 to €5 billion, whereby the latter figure
refers to the cost saving that could be made if the average US fund size could be reached
(Heinemann and Jopp, 2002). Fragmentation also limits the choice of investment products and
reduces competition, the cost of which is difficult to quantify. While many of the differences
between markets are rooted in structural factors such as consumer preferences and distribution
networks, others are policy-induced and could be addressed by policy-makers. This is
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
The structure of the European banking sector also impacts on the competitiveness of the fund
industry. Unlike the US, funds in Europe are mostly sold through banks, which have a strong
bias towards their own funds. In Germany, 80% of funds are sold through bank branches, 70%
in France and 61% in Spain. In the UK, independent advisers are the most important sales
channel, while in Italy distribution is split equally among banks and independent advisers (both
about 43%). In the US, only 8% are sold through bank branches, the most important channels
being brokers and direct sales (Walter and Smith, 2000, p. 235). As European bank
restructuring has mainly happened at the national level, this will not have had the effect of
increasing competition or improving customer choice. On the contrary, it may have
strengthened vertical integration in European financial markets.
Table 4. Annual growth rate of the assets of institutional investors in Europe
95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 AAG 95-99
1
Investment funds 21% 23% 30% 33% 15% 1% 27%
Pension funds 10% 19% 12% 15% 3% n.a. 14%
Insurance 12% 19% 10% 10% 7% n.a. 13%
1 Average nominal annual growth between 1995-99.
Sources: CEA, Eurostat, EFRP, FEFSI and OECD.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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Table 5.   Total assets of investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies and banks
(2000, billions of euro and % of GDP)
GDP Investment
funds % GDP Pension
funds % GDP Insurance % GDP Banks % GDP
B 246.1 74.6 30.3 14.5 5.9 102.3 41.6 778.1 316
DK 176.0 34.7 19.7 42.0 23.9 137.1 77.9 234.2 133
D 2032.9 252.6 12.4 331.3 16.3 871.2 42.9 5425.5 267
EL 121.5 30.9 25.4 5.1 4.2 0.1 0.1 138.6 114
E 606.3 183.0 30.2 42.4 7.0 80.9 13.3 1077.6 178
F 1394.4 765.9 54.9 92.2 6.6 856.5 61.4 3512.9 252
IRL 103.1 148.7 144.3 52.5 51.0 46.1 44.8 370.2 359
I 1165.7 449.9 38.6 30.0 2.6 243.2 20.9 1895.8 163
L 20.5 792.8 3867.2 0.1 0.2 24.0 116.9 647.7 3160
NL 401.6 101.8 25.3 445.0 110.8 259.9 64.7 1621.2 404
A 205.9 83.2 40.4 24.7 12.0 48.8 23.7 562.2 273
P 113.5 18.6 16.4 13.1 11.5 22.4 19.8 262.3 231
FIN 132.0 13.5 10.2 11.8 8.9 75.5 57.2 128.3 97
S 246.6 83.2 33.7 139.6 56.6 222.1 90.1 316.9 128
UK 1533.1 415.5 27.1 1240.2 80.9 1637.4 106.8 2673.7 174
EU-15 8499.2 3448.8 40.6 2484.4 29.2 4627.5 54.4 19644.9 231
CH 253.0 87.8 34.7 321.0 126.9 244.3 96.6 1403.6 554.8
US
1 10738.7 7485.5 69.7 9729.262 90.6 3744.1 34.9 7860.4 73
JP
1 5152.9 464.3 9.0 2109.7 49.9 2237.6 43.4 6969.9 135
1.Provisional value of pension funds in 2000.
Sources: CEA, Eurostat, EFRP, FEFSI and OECD (2002).12
CHAPTER 3
THE REGULATORY CONTEXT
n regulatory terms, the asset management industry as such does not exist. Rather, the
regulatory regime depends upon the particular licence that the financial institution in
question possesses. This may be as a bank, insurance company, pension fund, broker or
investment fund,  which  immediately raises the question of possible inconsistencies across
regulatory regimes, or arbitrage between regimes. For certain forms of the asset management
business, which definitively belong to one of these groups, the choice will be non-existent; for
others, however, it will present itself as an issue.
Diversity is one striking factor in the regulatory framework. This is a reflection of differences
in the relative importance of various sectors from one country to another, as outlined in the
previous chapter. Although  sector regulation has been harmonised to a large extent at  the
European level, implementation of EU rules may vary,  with supervisory structures and
practices continuing to differ from country to country.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the rationale behind regulation in the asset
management sector and the different approaches followed. Secondly, rules applicable to the
asset management industry following sectoral subdivisions will be reviewed. The focus will
essentially be on investment and asset allocation rules, followed by a brief reference to some
horizontal directives affecting the sector, and an evaluation of the different regimes.
3.1 Rationale for the prudential regulation of asset management
Why should the asset management business be regulated? If asset management is about
managing funds for third parties, would general regulation to prevent fraud and to ensure due
diligence by managers not be sufficient? Following this line of reasoning, asset management
regulation would, in essence, be composed of basic prudent person asset diversification rules,
as well as comprehensive conduct-of-business rules to protect consumers. Unlike banking,
where consumer deposits are invested in illiquid loans to enterprises and where a string of bad
investments can give rise to systemic effects, a capital cushion would, in principle, not be
needed. Asset managers’ funds are generally invested in liquid securities, which can be realised
immediately. The task of the asset manager is to provide a good return for investors, or to
ensure that his or her claims can be honoured in the case of accident or death. If the manager
does not realise good returns, the investor can change shop. More regulation in the form of
capital requirements would make asset management more costly or might create protective
entry barriers. Too high a level of protection of investors, for example in investor
compensation schemes, might reduce market discipline and create some form of moral hazard
behaviour. Proper incentives should be in place for investors to monitor carefully in whose
hands they leave their investments.
In practice, prudential capital regulation has developed in response to market failures as a
safeguard against systemic risk and to protect consumers. Since taxpayers will incur much of
the cost of the failure of an institution to adequately manage its business, minimum capital
standards can be used to ensure that institutions do not abuse such protection. Minimum capital
requirements for asset managers can also form a buffer against large shocks that affect the
financial system. One firm’s decision to increase its capital base to face such circumstances
would benefit other firms that do not maintain sufficient capital, hence the need to require all
firms to maintain a minimum capital standard – the level playing field argument. Consumer
protection is probably the most important argument for capital regulation in asset management.
Since a consumer finds it difficult to evaluate the financial soundness of the firm, they may be
vulnerable to adverse selection. They may select a firm that is not in a position to deliver the
benefits that are promised in the future, for example. A capital requirement may be a form of
IPAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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threshold, although somewhat crude, to ensure a minimum protection for consumers.
Allocation rules in asset management have developed on the basis of these arguments, albeit in
different ways across countries. Well diversified portfolios should form a better buffer against
systemic risk (e.g. internationally diversified) and provide better average returns to investors
over time.
The fact that US securities law does not impose minimum capital requirements on mutual fund
managers shows that there is no general consensus on this point.
5 Crude capital requirements
do not take into account the risk profile of the institution in question. They may level the
playing field between different financial institutions whereby they equalise the threats they
pose for the financial system, without providing an incentive for more prudently managed
firms, or taking the different nature of firms into account. A more internal ratings-based
approach, as is being proposed in the context of the Basel Capital Adequacy Review, is also
gaining favour in the area of asset management. A recent report for the European Commission
on the application of solvency ratios in the insurance industry proposed to apply the same
three-pillar approach to insurance (European Commission, 2002).
The situation in the insurance sector is somewhat different from that in the fund management
sector. Unlike fund management companies, insurance companies insure policyholders against
risks, such as retirement, death, accident, fire, etc. To face potential claims from policyholders,
insurers calculate the reserves needed on the basis of longevity, mortality and accident
statistics. Without a minimum solvency regulation,  insurers could rely on their premium
income and investment returns to meet claims. In these circumstances, the risk of insolvency
would be very high, and an insurer could easily declare bankruptcy if claims exceeded
premium income and asset returns, leaving consumers disgruntled and the cost of an eventual
bail-out to the state.
Risk to insurance companies increases with rapid and sudden change in certain patterns, such
as natural disasters, rapid increases in longevity or, as noticed recently, variances in financial
markets. Insurance managers may often not take such sudden changes into account and assume
that certain trends of the past will continue. Moreover, certain insurance companies and
pension funds promise their policyholders guaranteed annuities, providing a certain income to
the point of death. In other cases, minimum returns on life insurance policies are set by the
state. The important thing for supervisors is to closely monitor the reserves that are set aside
for embedded options in the annuity contract. Declining mortality and long bond rates, for
example, increase the risk of losses, threaten the annuity stream, and eventually lead to  the
insolvency of the insurer, as seen with Equitable Life in the UK. Further increases in reserves
at an early stage are needed in such cases (Davis, 2002, p. 11).
According to Davis, the case for quantitative portfolio restrictions is strong for companies with
guaranteed annuities. For such institutions, the matching  of assets  with similar duration is a
desirable strategy. Strict portfolio regulations, however, could limit the opportunity to seek
higher returns in order to develop new products. Prudent-person-based diversification and
solvency rules, as well as comprehensive conduct-of-business rules to protect consumers,
should be sufficient for a general insurer (Davis, 2002, p. 16).
                                                
5 Also under the recently enacted Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, investment management company affiliates
of Financial Holding Companies are exempt from capital requirements. Gramm-Leach-Bliley prohibits
the Federal Reserve Board from imposing capital adequacy rules on functionally regulated (this means
regulated by the SEC) non-depositary subsidiaries of Financial Holding Companies. Nevertheless, some
state regulatory authorities in the US have imposed minimum capital requirements (see  Calomiris and
Herring, 2002, pp. 14-15).PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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3.2 The European regulatory framework
EU regulation covering the free provision of financial services in the asset management
industry started with the UCITS  (undertakings for collective investment in transferable
securities) directive of 1985, which introduced the single licence for selling investment funds
in the EU. It was followed in the early 1990s with the single licence directives covering
banking, insurance and investment services sectors. The UCITS directive was amended and
expanded in 2002 to become a more horizontal asset management directive. A provisional
agreement was also reached in 2002 on the last outstanding piece of free provision of services
regulation in the financial services sector, the pension funds directive.
Some horizontal elements of EU legislation are also of relevance to the asset management
industry, the most important being the distance selling of financial services directive, on which
a final agreement was reached in May 2002. The draft conglomerates directives will also be
discussed briefly.
3.2.1 Investment funds
The 1985 UCITS directive opened the way for the cross-border sale of investment funds in the
EU. Subject to some general criteria regarding authorisation, legal structure, investment
policies and disclosure, units of open-ended funds that invest in transferable securities could be
sold freely throughout the EU. Marketing and tax rules did not fall within the scope of this
directive, which meant that they remained host-country issues. Prospectuses had to be
translated into the official language of the host country, for example, and local consumer
protection regulation had to be respected.  Nor did the directive  harmonise the prudential
requirements of the companies managing investment funds. For example, it did not set a
minimum capital standard or solvency requirements. This was modified by the 2002
amendments.
The investment policy rules of the UCITS I were fairly liberal. UCITS could invest in a
diversified portfolio of listed equity and debt securities, respecting the 5/10/40% rule: limits
apply of 5% for stock of a single body (which can be extended to 10% by the home country
authorities), and an overall limit of 40% for the total of large single blocks of securities. A limit
of 10% applied for non-listed securities. Exceptions applied for government or government
guaranteed paper. The limit applicable for investment in other funds was 5% of the whole
portfolio, meaning that funds of funds were not permitted. Real estate and commodity funds
were excluded from the directive, as were money market instruments.
The 2002 UCITS amendments expand and detail the UCITS I directive. One directive (UCITS
II or the “Product Directive”) widens the investment possibilities of funds to instruments such
as derivatives and allows for new forms of funds, such as funds of funds, money market funds,
cash funds or index tracker funds. A second directive (UCITS III or the “Promoter Directive”)
details minimum standards, including the introduction of a minimum level of own funds, and
broadens the permissible activities of the fund management company. It also introduces a
simplified prospectus, which provides for easier and comparable information to investors. The
amendments need to be implemented by the member states by August 2003, although existing
UCITS may be “grandfathered” for a further five years from the date when the amended
directive comes into force (at the latest in August 2003), meaning that they will be allowed to
continue to function temporarily under the UCITS I framework.
The new UCITS directives did not come about easily, but the end-result is gaining broad
acceptance in policy and industry circles.
6 An earlier proposal for expanding the scope of the
                                                
6 Olle Schmidt, Member of the European Parliament and rapporteur for the directive, said at the first
meeting of the Task Force on 29 November 2001, that “the common position on the directive strikes a
good balance between investor protection and investment freedom, between the demands of thePAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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directive had to be withdrawn in 1995, and subsequent drafts took almost four years to be
formally proposed by the EU Commission.
7 These directives are not yet of the “framework”
type, with broad implementing powers for a Securities Committee, as proposed by the
Lamfalussy Group, since they were proposed before this new procedure was adopted. UCITS I
provided for a “Contact Committee” with limited implementing powers, which are somewhat
extended by UCITS II, but not comparable to what is being proposed in the post-Lamfalussy
context.
Correct implementation of the directive by member states (and the Accession Countries) will
be crucial. The European Commission and member state authorities will need to demonstrate
that, even if the directives date from pre-Lamfalussy times, the new approach will be applied in
practice, meaning that member states’ authorities will need to cooperate fully in order to ensure
correct implementation, while the Commission will undertake enforcement procedures. It
remains to be seen whether all parties are amenable to this aim. The Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC) has, in the context of the extension of the Lamfalussy procedures, proposed
to integrate the UCITS Committee within the Securities Committee-CESR structure (EFC,
2002), but this still gives rise to legal problems. Only through a formal change to the UCITS II
directive can the existing UCITS Contact Committee be integrated into the Securities
Committee structure,
8 and even more so for the expansion of articles that can be revised by
such a Committee.
The most important achievement of the updated UCITS is the single licence for fund
management companies. The 1985 UCITS directive did not give the single passport to
companies, but only to the cross-border marketing of its units. The minimum harmonisation at
company-level in the 1985 directive was very limited and, in this respect, it could be
considered surprising that the UCITS I directive has been so successful. The UCITS III
directive grants the “single licence” to fund management companies in the broad sense of the
word. It does not only comprise of the management of investment funds, the “core services”,
but also other forms of portfolio management, such as  pension funds  for individuals,
investment advice, safekeeping (custody) and administration of investment funds, which are
seen as “non-core” or ancillary.
9 A fund management company, which has been duly
authorised in one member state, can thus also offer pension fund management services in
another member state, provided the pension fund in the host country is allowed to do so under
its local laws (i.e. awaiting the adoption of the draft pension funds directive, discussed below).
UCITS III introduces a minimum capital requirement of €125,000 for investment fund
companies and an on-going own capital of 0.02% of total assets (with a maximum of €10
million when the assets exceed €250 million).  Total own funds however can never be lower
than the amount described under “other risks” in the capital adequacy directive (directive
93/6/EEC, henceforth CAD), which states that a company’s own funds shall never be less than
13 weeks of “fixed overheads”. This could also include, when the New Basel Capital Accord
comes into force in the EU, an operational risks charge as foreseen for banks and investment
                                                                                                                                                    
European Parliament and the demands of industry”. FEFSI, the industry federation, welcomed the
directive.
7 The 1993 proposal to expand investment funds to money market funds stranded as a result of the
turmoil on European currency markets. See Proposal for a Council directive amending 85/611/EEC on
the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective
investment in transferable securities (UCITS), COM(93)37 of 9 February 1993, OJ C 59 of 2.3.93.
8 See Art. 53 of UCITS I and Art. 53a of UCITS II.
9 Other forms of portfolio management, i.e. management of pension fund portfolios or those of
individuals, are presented as a form of “derogation” from the central objective of the directive, which is
management of investment funds as authorised under the directive (Art. 5). The wording of this Art. 5
alone already indicates how important a close scrutiny of the implementation process will be.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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firms. The directive also stipulates that up to 50% of  ongoing capital requirement can be
replaced by a guarantee from a bank or insurance company. The new capital requirement of the
directive is not seen as problematic by the industry, as most companies hold a multiple of what
is required by the directive.
10
Minimum standards for the conduct of business by investment fund companies are harmonised
and monitored by home country authorities. The company must act honestly and fairly, with
due care and diligence, having the resources and procedures in place that are necessary for the
proper performance of activities. It must try “to avoid conflicts of interest, and when they
cannot be avoided, ensure that the UCITS it manages is fairly treated” (Art. 5h). Persons
directing the management company must be of “good repute” and “sufficiently experienced”,
and their names must be communicated to the competent authorities. The conduct of the
company must be at least decided by two persons meeting these conditions.
11 In case the
investment company provides “non-core” or ancillary services, the conduct-of-business rules
of the investment services directive (ISD) shall apply (see below).
UCITS III also introduces a simplified prospectus for the sale of harmonised investment funds,
which, according to the industry federation FEFSI, is much more investor friendly. Prospectus
documentation needs to be composed of a full and a simplified prospectus, which must be kept
up to date, and an annual and half-yearly report. All these documents need to be published in
the official language(s) of the host country but should allow for cross-border recognition
without additional documents.
12 The notification and translation requirements of UCITS
continue to vary from one member state to another, however. Although the directive specifies
which documents need to be provided to the authorities, many countries require additional
information, a fund’s board minutes for example, which also need to be translated.
13 Such
requirements lengthen the registration period. This again underlines the need for tight scrutiny
of the implementation process and a strong structure for cooperation among supervisory
authorities.
UCITS II determines what kind of funds can be sold with a single licence and sets investment
allocation rules. It now also covers funds invested in money market instruments, index funds
(funds of funds), other funds and derivatives. The investment limits of the 1985 directive have
been further detailed, depending on the instruments. Overall, the 5/10/40% rule continues to
apply. Maximum levels of 10% apply for investments in money market instruments issued by
the same body, and of 20% for investments in one single other fund (also applicable for index
tracker funds) and for deposits with credit institutions.
The 2002 UCITS amendments are seen to be important contributors to the further growth of
European capital markets in general, and the European investment fund markets in particular. It
is expected that the euro commercial paper market should flourish as a result of the expansion
                                                
10 According to Patrick Zurstrassen at the ICBI Fund Forum in Rome of July 2002.
11 Requirements could have gone further, by requiring funds to have independent directors, as is the case
in the US, and an audit committee, but this was regarded as expensive and too difficult to realise by the
industry. For an overview of governance systems of UCITS, see Thompson and Choi (2001).
12 For comparison, the draft prospectus directive regarding initial offerings of securities (July 2001,
updated August 2002), proposes that only the summary note will have to be translated for cross-border
offerings in case the registration document and securities note are published in a language that is
“customary in the field of finance”. But UCITS III does not follow the maximum harmonisation
approach of the prospectus directive.
13 See Clifford Chance, Constraints on Marketing UCITS Cross-Border in Europe, Summary Paper, 22
February 2002.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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to money market funds.
14 It is well known however that, in the area of index tracking funds,
problems in respecting the 5/10/40% rule may occur. Many European sector-based indexes
cannot be tracked  exactly without exceeding the 40% rule, some even exceed the 10% rule
since there are not enough companies in a certain sector present in the index, or there are a few
big firms dominating the sector, and thus the index (see Table 6 below). UCITS II tries to
respond to these issues by Art. 22a, which gives the possibility of raising the single entity limit
to 20%, but it is unclear how this fits in with the general rule and thus with the consistency of
the text. It should be added, however, that these index tracking funds are not necessarily
registered as UCITS.
Table 6.   Weighting of shares in European sector-based DJ Stoxx indexes
(following the 5/10/40% rule)
Sector Number of shares
in index
Shares > 10% Share of large blocks
> 40% rule
Weight of 5 largest
shares
Food (F&B) 25 3 70.1% 70.1%
Media 37 1 37.4% 42.1%
Techno 37 3 65.2% 65.2%
Telecom 27 2 74.2% 56.9%
Chemicals 16 3 74.0% 63.7%
Healthcare 36 4 81.4% 74.1%
Retail 27 1 63.3% 47.1%
Banks 66 1 36.4% 36.4%
Source: DJ Eurostoxx (as of 27 May 2002).
3.2.2 Insurance companies
European insurance markets were liberalised in two steps. The “third-generation” insurance
directives, which introduced the single passport in the insurance sector, came into force in July
1994, but was preceded in 1990 by a form of partial liberalisation for informed customers on
the life insurance side and large risks on the non-life side. Harmonisation of asset allocation
rules only occurred in the “third-generation” insurance directives, which introduced minimum
rules for the qualitative and quantitative investment of assets. The minimum solvency margin
(the capital adequacy of the insurance sector) has recently been updated.
15
In insurance, potential policyholder claims are backed by technical provisions that are set to
cover anticipated claims and associated costs arising from the policies underwritten. The
“third-generation” insurance directives set rules for admissible assets to cover  technical
provisions and their diversification. With regard to  admissible assets, the directives only set
some general principles that needed to be followed, leaving member states the choice of
whether to establish more detailed quantitative rules. As for  diversification, maximum
percentages apply for single blocks of real estate investment (<10%), cash (<3%), non-listed
securities (<10%), single holdings (<10%) and the total of single large holdings or loans. As
with UCITS, the 5/10/40% rule for investment in tradable securities also applies to insurance
                                                
14 See the contribution to the Task Force by John E. Ford of Deutsche Bank on “The Impact on the Euro
on the Commercial Paper Market”, 26 February 2002.
15 Issues related to the regulation and supervision of insurance companies in the EU are the subject of a
new CEPS Task Force created in 2003.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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companies. Member states can lay down more detailed rules – in this case lower maximum
percentages on asset diversification for firms under their supervision following certain general
criteria. The directives also contain rules on currency matching, which prohibit insurance firms
from holding more than 20% of their assets denominated in currencies that do not match the
currency denomination of liabilities.
In the implementation of the third insurance directives, most continental European countries
have continued to apply detailed quantitative restrictions on admissible assets and have
transposed asset diversification rules as prescribed in the directive. The UK, on the contrary,
has relied more on the prudent-person rule, and likewise for the diversification rules.
16 The end
result is that asset allocation in the insurance sector has continued to differ, as exemplified
above, depending on local traditions and different views on risk and admissible assets. Since
restrictions come at a cost in average, real or nominal returns,
17 competition should benefit
more prudent-person-based rules, and thus lead to a further reduction or elimination of
quantitative limits in national law.
Insurance companies are required to maintain a guarantee fund or a buffer that they need in
order to cover unexpected losses and costs as minimum capital. Moreover, they must reinsure
part of their risks with reinsurance companies. A recent directive increased the minimum
guarantee fund to €3 million (or €2 million for certain classes of non-life insurance). The
guarantee fund should be at least equal to one-third of the solvency margin, which is
proportional to the total business underwritten. Supervisors have also been given increased
powers to intervene in obliging insurance companies to maintain a higher solvency margin in
case policyholders’ interests are threatened.
18 An ongoing review (the Solvency II project) is
seeking to establish a system that better matches the true risks of an insurance company. A
recent study proposes to apply to the insurance sector the same three-pillar approach suggested
in the context of the Basel Review (European Commission, 2002). It adds however that an
approach to risk-modelling may not be achievable or necessarily desirable in leaving firms
sufficient scope for innovation in risk management. Prudential supervision is indeed starting to
become more and more comparable to what is being discussed in banking or what is applicable
to it.
3.2.3 Pension funds
After an initial failure in the early 1990s, the European Commission succeeded with its new
proposal for the liberalisation of pension fund management and investment in the EU, which is
expected to be formally adopted in the first half of 2003. Although the draft is less far-reaching
than the first and its scope more restrictive, it definitely introduces the single licence for
pension funds with the “prudent man” as the basic investment rule. It inaugurates a Community
legal framework for pension funds, the last area of the financial services sector where no
Community legislation had previously existed. The directive does not harmonise vesting rules,
nor does it affect the tax treatment of contributions to pension funds or the pay-out by pension
funds, which will be the subject of another proposal.
Today, as a result of the absence of a Community legal framework, pension funds are regulated
on a variety of bases in the member states, as either insurance companies, investment funds or
pension funds. This implies a cost for employers and employees in the contributions to pension
funds, in possible lower return on funds and in additional administrative expenses.
                                                
16 Davis (2002, p. 38).
17 Davis (2002, p. 17).
18 Directive 2002/12/CE (2002/13/CE) of the European Parliament and of the Council amending council
directive 79/267/EEC (73/239/EEC) as regards the solvency margin requirements for life (non-life)
assurance undertakings, 5 March 2002.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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Contributions to pension funds established in other member states are not tax-deductible,
which obliges migrating employees to be members of funds in different member states, or
imposes extra costs on firms when making pension contributions on behalf of their employees.
Custodians of pension funds are often required to have a separate establishment in the member
state in which the fund resides. Restrictions on pension fund investments have not been
harmonised, implying possible lower returns from the perspective of optimal portfolio
allocation. An overview of the most important quantitative restrictions on pension fund
investments in Europe is given in Table 7.
Table 7. Most important quantitative restrictions on pension fund investments in Europe
B >15% in government bonds
DK rules of the EU’s 3rd life insurance directive, 80% currency-matching
F >50% EU government bonds
D
1 <35% EU equities, <25% EU property, <6% non-EU equities, <6% non-EU bonds,
<20% overall foreign assets, >70% currency-matching
I <20% liquid assets, <50% non-listed OECD securities, <5% non-OECD securities,
>30% currency-matching
P <40% in foreign equity
CH <50% real estate, <30% Swiss equities, <30% foreign loans,  <25% foreign equities
1 Rules for Germany refer to insurance companies and pensionskasse; new legislation has recently
introduced the prudent-man rule for a new type of pension funds.
Source: Updated from Lannoo (1998).
The first proposal for a directive had to be withdrawn by the European Commission in 1994,
mainly as a result of broad disagreements regarding pension fund investment policies, but also
as a result of the ignorance and ideological stances of some member states. The draft pension
funds directive contained only qualitative, prudent-person-based rules for the spread of
investments in the EU, and a lower currency-matching rule than the life insurance directives,
which represented the main stumbling block of the proposal. This directive would thus have
favoured retirement savings in the form of pension funds, as compared to group insurance
schemes, which are subject to life insurance directive rules.
19 Some member states with
pension funds, such as Denmark, however, have made their pension funds subject to the rules
of the life insurance directives, but most other member states with sizeable pension funds have
kept them under a separate legal regime.
Under the new UCITS III directive, fund managers will be able to offer their services for the
management of investment portfolios on a European basis, including those of pension funds.
Pension funds from the different states however can still be required to follow specific rules for
asset allocation, as in force within their territory. Moreover, UCITS III does not affect the right
of member states to require pension funds to have a separate licence.
The proposal on which agreement was reached at the Ecofin Council on 4 June 2002
overcomes these barriers.
20 It introduces the single passport for pension fund management and
investment in the EU, under the control of the home country. It lays down the prudent-man
                                                
19 This was the reason why the insurance sector in some member states strongly opposed the first draft.
See Lannoo (1996) for a detailed assessment of the failure of the first draft directive.
20 The formal common position by the EU Council followed on 5 November 2002, after which it was
sent to the European Parliament for a second reading. The EP reinstated the “biometric risk” amendment
in the second reading.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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principle for investments, meaning that assets need to be invested taking qualitative criteria
into account (nature and duration, proper diversification). In this sense, the Council
compromise follows the European Commission proposal. Remaining provisions are left to
mutual recognition between member states, such as the calculation of technical provisions or
the governance of pension funds.
Technical provisions and funding proved to be quite controversial subjects. With respect to the
former, major concerns were expressed regarding the method of calculation, certifications by
actuaries and the role of insurance advisors. Additional issues raised related to a lack of
confidence in the proposed technical provisions and the fact that if a minimum nominal rate
would have been set, more harmonisation would be envisaged than in life insurance proposals.
The directive therefore left it to the member states to set more detailed rules. With regards to
funding, there was some suspicion surrounding the possibility of derogating from full funding.
Specific provisions were nevertheless accepted to depart from it. In the case of cross-border
activity, technical provisions shall be fully funded at all times. For the calculation of the
solvency margin, the rules of the life insurance directive shall apply.
Only one quantitative restriction on investment rules is general to the directive, i.e. the limit for
investments in the sponsoring undertaking, which is set at 5% per individual undertaking (and
10% for the group). For the remainder, the key feature of the directive is the prudent-man
principle as the main guiding mechanism for asset allocation. Member states may lay down
more detailed quantitative rules for institutions established within their jurisdiction,
21 provided
that they do not lower the threshold for investments in shares or similar instruments below 70%
and non-matching currencies below 30%. Member states can apply the same investment rules
to the occupational pension business of life insurance companies (covered by directive
92/96/EEC), in which case the business is ring-fenced, managed and organised separately from
the insurance company’s other activities, without any possibility of transfer.
In the event of cross-border activity, the competent authorities of each host state may impose
additional quantitative restrictions, provided the same or stricter rules apply to institutions
located in that state. In this case, the following rules may apply: a maximum of 5% with a
single issuer (10% for a single group), a maximum of 30% of shares traded on non-regulated
markets, and a maximum of 30% of assets in non-matching currency. This addition of the so-
called “prudent-person-plus” rule (Art. 18.7) was necessary to reach a compromise in the
Council, but it is expected that these restrictions  will probably be limited to four member
states. If these restrictions are applied, the home member state of a pension fund not applying
these quantitative restrictions can ask the investments (assets and liabilities) of the pension
fund in the country that applies these restrictions to be ring-fenced, without any possibility of
transfer.
Pension fund members will need to be adequately informed regarding the investment policy’s
level of benefits in case of termination of employment, accrued entitlements and investment
risk. The directive will not apply to institutions managing social security schemes or to
companies using book-reserve schemes. The application to civil servant pension funds is left to
the discretion of member states.
With cross-border membership, the underlying principles ask for prudential requirements plus
supervision by the home member state, while social and labour law requirements are left to the
host member state. The host state may only intervene in  a last resort should some sort of
misconduct take place. It has, in principle, the duty to inform the home authority of the pension
fund  at which point the home regulator is expected to act. The above may only properly
function under the cooperation and exchange of information among national authorities, which
                                                
21 The draft directive says, “In particular, member states may apply investment provisions similar to
those of Council directive 92/96/EEC” (the third life insurance directive).PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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requires an adaptation of the role of the EU Insurance Committee to  also cover the pension
funds directive. This has also been proposed by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC)
in the context of the extension of the Lamfalussy procedures to banking and insurance.
3.2.4 Banks
Banks are permitted to carry out the broadest range of activities among all financial institutions
in an EU context as a result of the “universal banking” approach. The set of applicable rules,
however, are also the most extensive. Moreover, a s a result of ongoing Basel Committee
discussions, capital adequacy rules will become even more complex.
Further to the second banking directive (1989), EU licensed banks are permitted to pursue a
broad set of activities, ranging from traditional banking to more investment-related businesses,
such as portfolio management and advice, safekeeping and administration of securities, trading
in and underwriting of securities, and advice on  M&As. Banks are subject to the capital
adequacy rules of the solvency ratios directive (this is the translation in EU law of the 1988
Basel Accord) or, for their trading book, to the rules of the capital adequacy directive (CAD).
This was introduced to guarantee the level playing field with separately authorised investment
firms in the EU. Banks are furthermore subject to rules limiting large holdings and limitations
on large credit exposures.
With the New Basel Accord approaching, capital adequacy will increasingly be based upon
internal models, available for all banking activities and for investment firms. A step in this
direction  was already taken in 1995 in the Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord to
Incorporate Market Risk. It became operational for the EU from 1998 onwards with the
adoption of value-at-risk models in CAD II. It is expected that Basel II will increase the cost of
credit, certainly in an initial phase, albeit only as a result of high implementing costs. In the
longer term, it may lead to lower capital charges for highly-rated borrowers, but higher capital
charges for low-rated borrowers (Meier-Ewert, 2001).  It is expected to lead to a further
consolidation and specialisation in banking, since smaller banks may be disadvantaged
compared to large ones, and specialised players may find it easier to apply the more
sophisticated approach.
A specific charge has also been proposed for operational risk in the context of the review of the
Basel Accord. This will, in a European context, be applied on a consolidated basis for asset
management arms of banks and investment firms, whereas this will not be the case for
investment firms or independent asset management firms based in the US. It is, however, too
early to say whether or not this will increase the capital charge for banks overall, since the
Basel Committee announced that it will calibrate its capital charge for operational risk so that
regulatory capital does not increase (Calomiris and Herring, 2002, p. 15).
3.2.5 Investment firms
Provisions on market risk of Basel II will also be applicable as the capital standard for all EU-
licensed investment firms, which are covered by the investment services directive. The ISD
covers individual portfolio management, securities brokerage and order execution activities.
The directive is currently being revised as the degree of harmonisation was lower than in other
single licence financial services directives, and more reliance was made on mutual recognition
such as in conduct-of-business rules, which has hampered market integration.
The ISD, which came into force in 1996, introduced the single licence for non-bank investment
firms and organised markets, i.e. exchanges. Although the directive was initially criticised as
being full of “red tape”, especially in the City, the ISD has been widely used for cross-border
provision of investment services, if one considers only the number of firms that have made use
of the single passport. In Italy, Sweden and Belgium, for example, there have been over 800
notifications of cross-border provision of services under the ISD (European Commission,PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
22
2000). The main problem has been the application of conduct-of-business rules (Art. 11) in
cross-border business, where investment firms may be subject to home and host country rules.
The directive states that compliance with conduct-of-business rules is the responsibility of the
member state “in which a service is provided”, which could be either the home or the host
country. This has also been applied to cross-border business with professional investors,
although a special provision for the latter group is foreseen in Art. 11.3, allowing for the
“professional nature” of the client to be taken into account.
The new proposal suggests a harmonisation of conditions applicable to different order
execution venues with the abolition of the “concentration” provision – this is the requirement
to channel all trades through the exchange – but with tighter regulation of “internalisation” of
trades by banks and investment firms to increase transparency, monitor conflict of interests and
guarantee “best execution” towards investors. The draft directive would also explicitly extend
cross-border membership to clearing and settlement facilities, which should increase
competition between back-office facilities and reduce the cost of cross-border settlement for
asset management.
22
The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) has issued standardised conduct-of-
business rules for retail and professional investors, which should eliminate the scope for host
country intervention in cross-border provision of services. The retail regime is fully
harmonised, whereas standards for the wholesale regime are much less elaborate. In the retail
regime,  a hand-holding relationship is the “base-case” of its provisions. With regards to
standards and rules of general application, provisions are made for outsourcing, conflicts of
interest and inducements, compliance and code of conduct. Concerning information to
customers, issues covered relate to marketing and information regarding the investment fund,
i.e. its products and services, risk warnings and reporting arrangements to the customer.
Additionally, reference is made to information from the customer to the fund manager (“know
your customer” principle on the duty of care and suitability) and on dealing requirements (“best
execution”). Management requirements specify a strict separation of functions (covering
independence and conflicts of interest), definition of investment strategies and that transactions
should be motivated only by the interest of the customer. The wholesale regime, by contrast, is
much less elaborate on issues related to the information that is to be provided to customers or
the duty of care for example. It applies to financial institutions, large corporations and others
who can ask for an opt-out under the retail regime.
3.3 Horizontal measures
The EU has enacted several other measures that impact investment business across the board,
or affect cross-border provision of financial services. They generally concern investor
protection or conduct-of-business regulation. The most problematic is the distance marketing
of financial services directive. Other relevant directives concern the supervision of financial
conglomerates, investor compensation schemes or the prevention of money laundering.
3.3.1 The distance marketing directive
The distance marketing of financial services directive defines in detail the information to be
supplied to consumers before the conclusion of a contract negotiated at a distance. It is a
maximum harmonisation directive, in the sense that member states must not adopt provisions
other than those laid down in the directive of the fields it harmonises. The directive defines the
contract form, the financial services covered, the information to be provided, the right of
                                                
22 The draft directive does not harmonise the operating conditions for  CSDs (central securities
depositories), which may come up in another draft directive. On the EU clearing and settlement industry,
see Lannoo and Levin (2001).PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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withdrawal (with a cooling-off period of 14 to 30 days, which does not apply  however for a
whole series of financial services, such as UCITS) and the settlement of disputes.
Three provisions of the directive are problematic. On unsolicited communications (Art. 10), the
provision for consumers to expressly opt-in or opt-out is left to the discretion of the member
states. This means that in some member states the general rule will be that consumers must
specifically opt-in for providers to be allowed to make unsolicited communications, whereas in
other member states it will be up to consumers to manifestly opt-out of it. This certainly does
not ease pan-European marketing campaigns with e-mail, for example, as providers will need
to know which rules apply in the different member states. Another provision of the directive to
cause concern is Art. 16, which states that member states can impose additional rules on
providers from countries where the distance-selling directive has not been properly
implemented. In practice, this provision opens the way to arbitrariness and overrules the
country-of-origin rules of the e-commerce directive (2000). A related doubtful provision is Art.
4, which states that member states may introduce more stringent requirements on prior
information when the provisions are in conformity with Community law.
3.3.2 Investor compensation schemes
Directive 97/9/EEC requires that each member state ensures that one or more national schemes
are established and officially recognised to compensate retail investors in the event of an
investment firm’s inability to repay money or return assets held on their behalf. It applies to
firms licensed under the ISD, but leaves it to the member states to apply it to UCITS. The
directive broadly follows the principles as laid down in the deposit guarantee directive and
introduces a minimum guaranteed coverage of €20,000. As many operational aspects are left to
the member states, however, the way in which different national compensation schemes work
varies considerably from one member state to another. Moreover, most member states did not
have investor compensation schemes in operation before this directive came into force. It is
thus too soon to make any judgements about their viability, or whether a further degree of
harmonisation is required.  Furthermore, failures of investment firms may only start to occur
more frequently now that the investment boom of the second half of the 1990s has come to a
close.
3.3.3 Money laundering
In the wake of the September 11
th attacks, EU institutions managed to reach an agreement on
an update of the money laundering directive. The 1991 money laundering directive required
financial institutions to keep identification files on clients involved in transfers exceeding
€15,000. The directive was however fairly narrow in scope, and gave rise to some important
differences in implementation across member states. Before the September 11 events, the draft
amendments to the directive had been stuck in co-decision due to disagreement between the
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council. The disagreement related to two
issues. First, the definition of what constituted a money laundering offence. Second, the extent
to which non-financial professions should be obliged to report suspected money laundering to
authorities.
The agreement reached by the Conciliation Committee in mid-October and voted through in
the European Parliament’s third reading on 13 November 2001, was a compromise whereby
the directive was extended to cover all crimes. Reporting requirements were also extended
under certain conditions to some non-financial professions  vulnerable to money-laundering
attempts, such as notaries and lawyers.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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3.3.4 Financial conglomerates
In a late amendment to the draft financial conglomerates directive, member states have also
explicitly proposed to make this new measure applicable to asset management companies. The
intention of this proposal was to adapt the European legal framework for the supervision of
financial institutions to heterogeneous groups. The intention of the proposal is to:
•  make sure that financial conglomerates are adequately capitalised,
•  introduce methods for calculating a financial conglomerate’s overall solvency position,
•  deal with the issues of intra-group transactions and group-exposure to risks,
•  make sure that a final supervisor is in place for such groups, and
•  ensure equivalence in the treatment of such groups.
The inclusion of asset management groups follows the adoption of the UCITS II and III
directives, which allow asset management companies to compete directly with investment
firms, which are already submitted to group-wide supervision. The directive provides that
member states will decide according to which sectoral rules these asset management companies
will have to be included in group-wide supervision (consolidated supervision of credit
institutions and investment firms and/or insurance undertakings in an insurance group), and the
scope of supplementary supervision within the meaning of this directive. The Commission is to
make a report on member states’ practices by 2007 and propose further harmonisation of EU
legislation if necessary.
3.4 Which regime to follow?
For the European Commission, asset management can be subdivided into a “collective” and an
“individual” component whereby insurance, investment funds and pension funds are
considered to be collective, and banking and brokerage are individual. The distinction is
certainly not clear-cut and for less well defined aspects of asset management, choosing the
right regulatory environment matters. This will be the case to an even greater extent with the
entry into force of UCITS III.
Making abstraction of specificities of national implementing legislation and other non-
harmonised aspects such as taxation, the most open regimes for asset management are those
falling under the second banking directive, the ISD and UCITS III. The bank licence will
remain expensive because of the high initial capital requirement, although the impact of the
Basel Review should be observed. UCITS III, which allows for investment management in the
broad sense, should certainly become an interesting regime. The advantages are low initial
capital requirements (€125,000), with an absolute cap of €10 million, and a low additional
charge for other risks. The rules on asset allocation are nevertheless strict, but exceptions are
possible.
The big question for UCITS III is the application of operational risk provisions, as is being
discussed in the context of Basel II. Through the reference in the UCITS III directive (Art. 5a)
to the CAD provisions on “other risks”, the operational risk charge may also apply to
investment firms, but it is too early to affirm this. If this were to be the case, investment
management companies would be even further disadvantaged vis-à-vis their US counterparts,
which have no initial capital requirement. This should, on the other hand, not be overplayed, as
the initial capital requirement is low and annual losses resulting from operational risks in the
fund industry amount to less than 1 basis point of assets under management.
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23 According to Patrick Zurstrassen on the basis of independently obtained data on the subject, ICBI
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The ISD allows for the broadest possibilities, with lower initial capital requirements than
banking, and no asset allocation rules. The directive has not been equally implemented in the
member states, however, and the basic text has left room for interpretation. The ongoing
review will ease cross-border business with the harmonisation of conduct-of-business rules for
professional investors, but the final outcome of the regulatory regime for “internalisation” of
order flow may still create problems. Requirements on best execution and client order handling
may increase the administrative burden and thus the cost for firms, and may lead to a further
consolidation in the sector. The application of an operational risk charge in the context of the
Basel Review will need to be followed, but again, it is too early to make any statements on this.
It has been argued that a capital charge for operational risk is not appropriate, since it is anti-
competitive and not risk-sensitive. It is discriminatory for smaller firms which do not have the
resources in place to rely upon more sophisticated approaches. A better approach would be to
rely upon process regulation and private insurance – both of which are proposed in the draft
ISD.
24 Process regulation requires firms to have the appropriate processes and procedures in
place to identify, measure, and control operational risk. Private insurance, such as indemnity,
employee fidelity and fraud insurance are seen to be more appropriate and are already widely
used.
25 Moreover, the application of operational risk charge may again be discriminatory for
EU investment firms as compared to their US counterparts, which will not be covered by it.
With regards to conduct-of-business rules, the harmonisation undertaken by the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR) for investment services is a big step forward. The new
CESR conduct-of-business rules (CBR)  however are burdensome, and purely voluntary as a
“level 3” issue under the Lamfalussy approach.
26 CESR will need to  show that this approach
can work, and that its members will live up to it; otherwise, more statutory harmonisation from
higher up will follow. Nevertheless, this still goes further than what is in place for UCITS
management companies, which will still need to follow host country advertising and marketing
rules.
The consistency of secondary legislation across sectors is of crucial importance for the asset
management industry. The procedures agreed to in the context of the Lamfalussy report are of
little comfort to the asset management industry, since asset management crosses the three basic
sectors of financial services. The consistency of procedures in banking, securities markets and
insurance is of crucial importance therefore. This is an issue that is on the agenda of the EU
Council of Finance Ministers, but it is not certain that the application of  Lamfalussy-style
procedures in the banking and insurance sectors will be acceptable to the European Parliament.
One solution is to expand the Securities Committee’s tasks to become a Finance Committee;
another is to upgrade the Banking Advisory Committee and the Insurance Committee. Our
preference would be the latter solution, as was proposed by the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC, 2002), and to ensure consistency of approach and settle problems of
conflicting rules across sectors in an upgraded Financial Services Policy Group.
                                                
24 Article 11 of the draft ISD II specifies that firms that are exempted from the CAD shall hold
professional indemnity insurance.
25 Calomiris and Herring (2002, p. 10).
26 “CESR members will seek to implement the Standards and Rules set out in this paper in their
regulatory objectives and, when possible, in their respective rules. If a CESR member does not have the
authority to implement a certain Standard or Rule, it will commend the Standard or Rule to its
government and to the responsible regulatory authority. CESR is committed to undertake reviews of
regulatory practices within the single market, on the basis of Article 4.3 of its Charter.” See CESR
(2002a, p. 4) and CESR (2002b, p. 10).26
CHAPTER 4
TAX OBSTACLES
ax is the main obstacle remaining in the integration of European fund management.
Large differences in the way member states tax fund management and outright
discriminatory tax barriers hamper funds from freely providing the full range of services
across borders. National taxation rules, by leading often to duplication of fund structures and
hence preventing funds from reaching optimal scale, also increase the cost of asset
management and reduce investor returns. This chapter of the report takes a closer look at these
obstacles. A first part looks at current national tax regimes and concludes that there are
significant differences in the way funds and their policyholders are taxed. A second part
examines the cross-border effect of such natural tax differences, but also at tax rules whose
purpose appears to be discriminatory, i.e. favouring domestic service providers at the expense
of foreign companies. One conclusion reached here is that measures could be taken at EU and
member state level that would significantly reduce such discriminatory barriers. The kind of
action that can be taken to reduce such tensions is the subject of the third and final part. It will
look at both ad hoc actions by the European Court of Justice and outline potential parallel
actions, e.g. increasing the effectiveness of double tax conventions.
4.1 Overview of current national tax regimes
The way in which funds and the fund policyholders are taxed varies considerably between
member states. While presenting business opportunities for fund managers, these differences
may also make cross-border fund management more difficult.
4.1.1 Tax treatment of funds
Tax treatment of funds depends on the nature of the fund. Most countries tax investment funds,
as they are regarded as separate entities subject to tax (Belgium being the only exception in the
EU). Nevertheless, investment funds often receive a more lenient tax treatment in order to
circumvent the problem of double taxation (i.e. taxing both fund and investor). This is
normally motivated by funds being regarded as fulfilling an important societal role in
providing a convenient savings vehicle. The tax treatment of funds can therefore take many
special forms:
•  Not subject to tax: for example a non-taxable person (e.g. Belgium) or exempted individual
(e.g. Finland).  In some countries an investment fund normally subject to tax may be
exempt if it fulfils certain conditions (e.g. on basis of activity as in Luxembourg).
•  Special tax base: in some countries investment funds are subject to tax but the taxable
income (base) is much lower than for other companies (e.g. investment companies in
Belgium) or reduced (e.g. paid distributions to investors subtracted from taxable income as
in Sweden or the UK).
•  Special tax rate: in some countries, investment funds are subject to tax but at special (low)
rates (e.g. the Netherlands where the rate can sometimes reach 0%).
•  Fully subject to tax but compensation at investor level: in some countries the investment
fund is fully subject to tax, but investors are normally compensated for the tax paid at fund
level via a reduction or an exemption of tax at investor level, as is the UK imputation
system, for example (IFA, 1997).
The impression that fund taxation is heterogeneous is further amplified when looking at
pension and life insurance funds. These funds are often granted favourable taxation by policy-
makers eager to encourage citizens to take charge of their retirement or to assume the risks they
TPAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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are facing. These numerous tax breaks result in complex and opaque tax rules, as exemplified
in Table 8.
Table 8. Taxation of pension and life insurance funds
Country Income
tax, %
VAT Premium taxes, % Other taxes
B 39 Exempt 3-9.25
(Compensatory funds:
0.25-10%)
§  0.17% on value of goods held by non profit pension
funds
§  9.25% tax on profits policies
DK 30 Exempt 1-50 §  4.5% on 190% of payroll
§  0.6-4% on deeds
D 25 Exempt 2-15
E 35 Exempt 6 §  1% tax on capital formation
F 33.33 Exempt 7-30
(comp. funds 1.9-8.5%)
§  1% financial institution overhead tax
§  4.25-13.6% social contribution tax
§  0.1% turnover tax on value of shares, stocks, real
estate etc.
§  Stamp duties
§  Profit-sharing plan
§  Professional tax
IRL 10 Exempt 2 §  1% on share capital
I 36 Exempt 2.5-21.25
(comp. funds 1-6.5)
§  Special tax on securities
L 30 Exempt 4-6 §  Municipal business tax (varies, 10% Lux.)
§  0.5% wealth tax
§  0.2% net wealth tax on capital
§  1% capital investment tax
NL 35 Exempt 7 §  1% of share capital
A 34 Exempt 1-10 §  1% of capital contributions
§  0.04-0.15% stock turnover tax (bonds, shares)
P 32 Yes, but
recovered on
pro rata basis
0.45-12 §  License fees
FIN 29 Exempt 22 § 
S 28 Exempt 15 § 
UK 30 Exempt 5 § 
US 35 Exempt 3-4 §  State capital and franchise taxes
CH 35 Exempt 2.5-5 §  0.5% on shareholder equity
Source: Lee (2002).
Premium taxes vary widely within the EU (0.25%-50%). All countries, with the exception of
Portugal, exempt these funds from VAT, while all countries, as in the case of investment funds,
impose a corporate income tax on funds. The last column is of particular interest, as it shows
the variety of additional taxes that financial institutions in general and funds in particular may
carry. These range from explicit taxes on financial institutions (France) to various taxes on the
financial assets and activities of a typical financial intermediary (e.g. capital formation taxes,
stamp duties, stock turnover taxes, etc.). In sum, there is thus considerable diversity in the way
member states tax funds.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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4.1.2 Taxation of policyholders
Not only are funds taxed, but so too are their policyholders. Taxation can take many forms –
taxation on distributions from the fund, taxation on the interest generated from the holding in
the fund and taxation on the attribution of income or gains (IFA, 1997).
Faced with an ageing  population, which implies that individuals will increasingly have to
provide for their own pensions, industrialised countries have tried to decrease taxes on interest
income for life insurance and pension funds in order to stimulate savings for retirement. As
with the taxation of funds, these tax breaks make it difficult to acquire an overall view of the
taxation of fund policyholders. While all the differences between member states in taxing
policyholders are beyond the scope of this report, the area of pensions illustrates well the form
and effect that such differences can take.
Table 9. Tax treatment of occupational pensions in the EU
EET
1 ETT
2 TEE
3
B ￿ ￿
DK ￿ ￿
D ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
EL ￿ ￿
E ￿ ￿
F ￿ ￿
IRL ￿ ￿
I ￿ ￿
L ￿ ￿
NL ￿ ￿
A ￿ ￿
P ￿ ￿
FIN ￿ ￿
S ￿ ￿
UK ￿ ￿
1 Exempt contributions, Exempt investment income and capital gains of the pension institution, Taxed benefits.
2 Exempt contributions, Taxed investment income and capital gains of the pension institution, Taxed Benefits.
3 Taxed contributions, Exempt income and capital gains of the pension institution, Exempt benefits.
Source: European Commission (2001b).
The most common treatment is to grant tax allowances for pension contributions and exempt
returns on fund assets while benefits remain taxed (van den Noord and Heady, 2001). Of the
current 15 EU member states, 11 practice such an EET system (Exempt contributions, Exempt
return on fund assets, Taxed benefits). Three member states also tax investment income (ETT).
Luxembourg and Germany are the only countries that take the opposite approach, by taxing
contributions but exempting investment income and benefits from taxation (TEE) (European
Commission, 2001b).
These differences lead to considerable cross-border difficulties. Few individuals are likely to
engage in “forum-shopping” (e.g. working in a country where contributions are exempt and
residing in a country where premiums are exempt). Nevertheless, differences in pension
taxation do effectively impinge upon the free movement of labour, as workers remain tied to
pension arrangements in the country where they have been working. Accordingly, the
divergence of pension tax rules hampers the development of truly European pension schemes.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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4.2 Cross-border effects of current national tax regimes
There is no reason why the taxation of funds should be harmonised between countries, as the
tax differences outlined above are natural reflections of systems tailored along competing
national lines. Such differences may, nevertheless, unintentionally act as barriers in an
integrated economic area such as the EU’s internal market. In some cases, national tax rules
may be specifically shaped to penalise foreign funds and/or to favour domestic funds and thus
keep asset management markets segmented.
4.2.1 Natural cross-border tensions
Income moving across borders with increasing ease has strained national tax systems. In an
economically integrated area, national tax rules developed without assessing their cross-border
effect may unintentionally act as discriminatory barriers. The EU has developed no systematic
and coherent way of allocating capital jurisdiction for tax purposes. Instead, “principles” have
developed on an ad-hoc basis. For example, member states aim to tax equity income where the
income is generated (source principle), but on the other hand try to tax debt income according
to the residence of the investor (residence principle) (Cnossen, 2000).
Currently, there are a number of ways in which countries try to mitigate the effects of foreign
taxes on residents. The two main approaches are:
•  Credit system: Some countries operate direct credit systems, i.e. they tax a tax subject’s
foreign-source income but credit the withholding taxes that the subject has paid abroad
(thus decreasing the domestic tax bill). Other countries operate an indirect credit system,
with the same benefits as direct systems, but also crediting corporate taxes paid abroad.
•  Exemption method: In some countries, all foreign source capital income is exempt from
domestic taxation.
Concerning the taxation of non-residents’ income, two means dominate:
•  Withholding taxes: This is the traditional way of taxing cross-border flows. Statutory
withholding tax rates of EU member states vary widely. On interest income, six EU
members did not impose withholding taxes on interest income in 2001. The remaining
members imposed standard rates varying between 15 and 27%. This is lower than both the
US and Switzerland, which have standard rates of 30 and 35% respectively (IBFD, 2001).
While the average level of withholding taxes on dividends is higher than on interest (20.6%
compared to 11.8%), the same disparity between member states can be observed. Double
taxation treaties often reduce statutory rates, however. For example, withholding taxes on
interest on bank deposits are rarely levied between EU member states (Portugal being the
only exception in the EU). Moreover, some interest income is more favourably treated than
others, e.g. interest on bank deposits (Huizinga and Nicodème, 2001). The  real
withholding tax rates are therefore significantly lower.
•  Information exchange: Information exchange can take many forms, one example being the
source country reporting the account information of non-residents to residence country tax
administrators. For a significant period of time, problems were of a practical nature,
although technological progress has somewhat decreased this complication. The major
remaining problem is more of a political kind i.e. unwillingness to exchange information.
This is linked to the strategic interests of some countries, where information exchange
would impinge upon one foundation of their financial centres, i.e. bank secrecy. Following
the OECD’s project on limiting harmful tax competition, information exchange has
nevertheless come to the forefront as the solution proposed by (most) industrialised
countries to tax capital income. The OECD has taken steps towards developing thePAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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operational side of the exchange (standards, means, assets etc.) (OECD, 2000).
Negotiations with tax havens have not yet been finalised however.
27 It also remains to be
seen whether OECD-members Luxembourg and Switzerland will consider themselves
bound by such a system, as they abstained from adopting the original OECD report.
The lack of an accepted model may contribute to competition between countries, complex and
potentially discriminatory tax systems and reduced tax revenues. Countries may find it too
costly to individually impose taxes or exchange information, as this may lead to capital flight
and an increase in the cost of capital due to the higher yields needed in order to compensate
investors for tax loss (Haflauer, 1998; McLure, 2001). Accordingly, capital placed in low-tax
jurisdictions abroad largely escape taxation at home. Faced with this tax risk, authorities have
an incentive to discourage their tax subjects placing savings with foreign service providers (e.g.
foreign fund managers).
28 Although member states’ ability to do so in the EU is outlawed, as
discriminatory tax measures are forbidden, such practices remain important.
4.2.2 Discriminatory tax barriers
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Apart from the inherent difficulties in allocating cross-border income flows for tax purposes, in
many cases countries deliberately penalise foreign service providers. As argued above,
concerns of tax consequences of placing capital abroad may offer a benign interpretation of
such behaviour. Other less altruistic reasons, e.g. outright protectionism, are most probably at
least as important.
In the UCITS area, for example, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and FEFSI have carried out two
studies on discriminatory tax barriers. One example of a country with such discriminatory
barriers is France, where the favourable taxation of funds was, in 2001, only accorded to
certain French funds (Plan d’Épargne en Action), which the then French Minister of Finance,
Christian Sautter, defended on the grounds that while France was willing to subsidise its
citizens’ investments in French funds, it was certainly not willing to extend that treatment to
investments in foreign funds (Newton, 2001). Another example is Germany, where the benefits
of the 2001 tax reform (only 50% of dividend income treated as taxable income) were accorded
to investments in domestic funds only.
30 A recent law would extend the same tax
discrimination to capital gains. A similar example is the UK, where the imputation system does
not apply to foreign equity. In other words, foreign equity dividends are not taxed at the same
reduced rate as domestic equity, where an imputation system attempts to avoid taxing the same
income stream twice. These barriers are costly, as they discourage cross-border selling of
funds, thereby preventing funds reaching a more optimal scale. According to research, the lack
of scale adds to the average cost in terms of fund charges.
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27 As of April 2002, 31 jurisdictions have decided to cooperate with the OECD while seven jurisdictions
have been classified as non-cooperative.
28 As illustrated by the Danner case (see below).
29 This section builds on the presentation by David Newton, partner of  PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
delivered to the Task Force on 11 June 2002, and a paper he wrote with FEFSI (Newton, 2001).
30 On 19 December 2002, the Commission sent an official request for information to Germany asking it
to explain what appeared to be tax discrimination. The letter of formal notice is the first step in the
infringement procedure, leaving Germany two months to reply. If the answer fails to satisfy the
Commission, it may issue a reasoned opinion demanding Germany to alter the law. If Germany does not
do so, the Commission may bring it to the Court of Justice (see Commission press release, IP/02/1924).
31 According to research by PwC and FEFSI, the lack of scale adds 40 basis points to the average cost in
terms of fund charges, which considering the overall market size represents a cost of €14 billion
(Newton, 2001). This is in line with the findings of the research of Schröder (2002), discussed above.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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4.3 Addressing cross-border effects of current national tax regimes
In order to reduce the tax obstacles to pan-European asset management, the Commission
should aim to eliminate discriminatory tax measures but also address some of the underlying
causes as to why such measures arise in the first place. This could be achieved, for example, by
reducing those differences in national tax systems that affect asset management and by
reaching a consensus on the taxation of non-residents’ savings income.
4.3.1 Eliminating discriminatory tax barriers
The dismantling of discriminatory tax barriers that prevent foreign funds from effectively
competing in certain national markets would have the most direct impact on asset management.
So far, the European Court of Justice has been the main driver behind the dismantling of
discriminatory tax barriers. Court action is only effective, however, if the cases are initiated
and brought forward, and this is not always the case at the present time. The Commission
claims to be overextended, and business seeks to avoid the wrath of local regulators. A first
step should be to increase the efforts of bringing cases of discrimination to the Court. While
this is primarily the responsibility of the Commission, those market participants who are
experiencing tax discrimination must bring it to public attention. Ad hoc Court action is,
nevertheless, unlikely to be sufficient to forge a coherent public policy response to the
underlying reason why such tax discrimination arises in the first place.
4.3.2 Increasing effectiveness of double tax conventions
Although many countries have used tax instruments to attract funds, most countries continue to
exercise their right to tax foreign funds at source. In addition, most countries do not give funds
access to tax treaties, as most funds do not fulfil such treaty requirements as “ persona
residence” and beneficial ownership rules. In theory, this is not a problem, as individuals have
access to double tax treaties and therefore could claim credit or compensation for taxes paid on
their investment abroad. This does not work in practice however and, as a result, double-
taxation at the level of the investment, the level of the fund, and the level of the investor, may
arise. This problem will become accentuated as globalisation implies that cross-border
investments will increase.
4.3.3 Parallel measures with indirect effects
Apart from outright protectionist reasons, discriminatory tax barriers may also originate as
unintended effects of national tax measures that have been developed without considering
potential cross-border effects, or because of member states’ fear of otherwise seeing capital
placed abroad and thus less easily taxed. In order to address these underlying causes for
discrimination, a number of measures supplementary to Court action may be considered.
a)  Promoting convergence between member states’ tax systems
As some of the tax measures with discriminatory effects derive from tax measures developed
without considering potential cross-border effects, a complement to Court action could be to
promote further convergence of those parts of national tax systems that have cross-border
effects. For example, the Commission is currently trying to achieve such limited convergence
in the taxation of occupational pensions, where it is trying to persuade member states to move
towards an EET-system (European Commission, 2001).
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A related area that may be of interest is the field of corporate taxation, where the Commission
is trying to convince member states to move towards converging the way that the corporate tax
                                                
32 For a critical analysis of the European Commission’s efforts to achieve pension portability, see
Mortensen (2003).PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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base is calculated. The aim is to reduce the compliance costs of companies, which currently
have to abide to 15 different company tax systems. According to Commission plans, this could
be achieved either by allowing mutual recognition of other member states’ tax systems, thus
allowing a company to choose one state as their “home state” for fiscal purposes, or by
agreeing on an EU corporate tax base that companies could opt for. Regardless of which
method is chosen, such convergence of tax bases would make it easier for credit institutions to
operate on a pan-European basis. Similar tax base convergence in the field of personal direct
income taxation could be desirable as well, but is unlikely to be politically feasible in the
foreseeable future.
b)  Achieving consensus on how to tax non-resident income
Discrimination is outlawed by EU law but, as illustrated above, many discriminatory tax
measures remain. Protectionism is not the only reason why member states effectively penalise
foreign service providers. Another reason is that they fear the tax consequences of their tax
subjects placing their capital abroad.
This is illustrated by the Danner case before the European Court of Justice. Rolf-Dieter
Danner, a German doctor working in Finland, claimed tax deductions for pension insurance
savings placed in a German fund. Although such deductions were permitted for Finnish funds,
the tax authorities denied Mr Danner full deductions. The reason why the Finnish law did not
grant similar tax deductions to Mr Danner’s German savings was that the working party
drafting the law found it “necessary to prohibit the deduction of contributions to foreign
voluntary pension insurance because the pension to be received in due course would in practice
often be excluded from taxation in Finland either because the recipient had moved abroad or
because of a lack of information about the pension payments” (ECJ, 2002, para. 7).
The ECJ did not accept that reasoning, as it found that the intended goal (avoid tax evasion)
could be achieved by less discriminatory means. In other words, fear of tax evasion does not
legitimise discrimination. The case is interesting, however, as it provides one illustrative tale of
the link between the increasing ability of citizens to place their savings abroad, member states’
fears for negative tax revenue consequences and the corresponding incentive for states to
discourage citizens from placing savings abroad.
If member states felt more comfortable that revenue would not be entirely lost if savings went
abroad, part of the incentive to discriminate against foreign service providers would disappear.
As outlined above, there are currently two major approaches in taxing non-resident income –
the levy of withholding taxes at source and exchanging information for tax purposes with other
countries’ tax administrators. Although home country tax administrators are likely to favour
information exchange, a system of withholding taxes with repatriation of part of the revenues
may also assuage tax authorities’ concerns. Accordingly, a consensus on  how to tax non-
resident savings is important in order to reduce incentives for member states to reduce their
citizens’ opportunity to use the services of foreign service providers via taxes.33
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
his report has focused essentially on two aspects of obstacles to pan-European asset
management. First, those resulting from regulatory differences in EU rules affecting the
asset management industry and, secondly, tax obstacles.
With regards to regulatory differences, we believe that there is no need for a horizontal asset
management directive at this stage. The UCITS III directive as well as the draft pension funds
directive allow for a broader use of the facilities provided for in the directive and reduce the
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. The main priority should thus be to focus on adequate
and consistent implementation across member states, strong cooperation between supervisory
authorities and swift adaptation in secondary legislation. The means to ensure that these steps
an be taken are not fully available, not only because the Lamfalussy procedures do not apply to
the UCITS directives, but also because asset management spans the whole sector of financial
services and a consistency of rules will be needed across banking, insurance and securities
markets. Although cooperation between EU banking and insurance supervisory authorities has
been in place for a much longer time than in the securities market sector, the procedures need
to be urgently upgraded to what is now in place for securities markets. This applies to the need
for broad consultation, as well as to the scope for secondary legislation and the structure of
cooperation between European and national regulatory and supervisory authorities. This should
be done in close cooperation with the European Parliament, in view of discussions leading to
the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference.
Tax obstacles to a more integrated market for asset management are, beyond doubt, the major
remaining problem. Differences in taxation are a natural reflection of tax systems developed
along national lines and in competition with other states. These differences are therefore not
problematic per se, as they reflect a healthy competition. National tax rules however often lead
to duplication of fund structures, preventing funds reaching optimal scale, resulting in higher
management costs. Moreover, national tax systems have difficulty coping with cross-border
flows of income. Sometimes these difficulties may have unintended effects that penalise
foreign service providers. In other instances, tax rules may have been deliberately designed to
deter foreign funds. So far, the EU has implemented no coherent or systematic way of
addressing these divergences, although a tax package has been on the table since 1997. Instead,
ad hoc actions towards reducing the most rampant restrictions to freedoms of the internal
market have been initiated by the ECJ.
In the light of the above, some tentative conclusions can be drawn:
•  Wide differences in tax rates and taxable bases exist between countries in the three fund
categories surveyed. Generally, pension and insurance funds are more favoured than
investment funds. While this reduces horizontal neutrality, it may be defensible from a
societal point of view (providing for future pension and risk needs). The wide differences
in taxation between countries, however, may make cross-border investment more difficult.
Moreover, there is a wide difference between countries regarding the compensation for
taxes paid abroad with some countries crediting and others not.
•  Little effective relief at policyholder level is in place for taxes incurred at fund level. The
reason is that double tax treaties do not effectively work for policyholders and funds are, in
most cases, excluded from those treaties. This anomaly ought to be corrected.
•  The ECJ should be supported in its efforts to eliminate restrictions to the freedoms of the
internal market. The Commission should bring more infringement cases forward, while
industry should assist the Commission by bringing forward restrictive practices
encountered or by initiating cases themselves.
TPAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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•  As a complement to the case-by-case action of the ECJ, attempts should be made at
reducing the underlying reasons why discriminatory tax measures blocking pan-European
asset management arise in the first place. One step would be to further the convergence of
those aspects of national tax systems that may give rise to discriminatory tax treatment.
Two such current initiatives by the Commission (the taxation of pensions where the
Commission is pushing for EET, and corporate taxation, where the Commission promotes
convergence in the way of computing tax bases) should be supported. Another step would
be to reduce member states’ concern with the tax consequences of savings placed abroad,
as evidenced by the Finnish authorities’ argument in the Danner case. Currently, such
savings easily escape home taxation and member states  have an incentive to discourage
capital being placed abroad accordingly (although under EU law they are not allowed to do
so). Consensus on how to tax non-residents’ savings income may reduce member states’
concerns and may be an important tool in the reduction of discriminatory treatment of
foreign funds.35
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ANNEX 1
BASIC RULES FOR CAPITAL ADEQUACY & ASSET ALLOCATION UNDER THE EU’S FINANCIAL SERVICES DIRECTIVES
Second banking
directive (2BD)
3rd insurance directives Draft pension funds
directive
Investment services
directive (ISD)
Investment funds directives
(UCITS)
Initial capital Min €5 million own
funds
Min €3 million guarantee fund
(€2 million for some classes of
non-life insurance)
Where the institution itself
underwrites the liability, the
rules of the life insurance
directive apply
Min €125,000 initial
capital for small brokers
(not trading for their own
account), others €730,000
(this still applies under
ISD II)
Min €125,000 initial capital
plus 0.02% of total assets (as
soon as assets exceed €250
million), with maximum of
€10 million (UCITS III)
Existing UCITS may be
“grandfathered” for up to 5
years
Additional capital
requirements
Min 8% of risk-
weighted assets (Basel
Accord) or VAR for
trading book (rules of
CAD I and CAD II)
Solvency margin must be
three times the guarantee fund,
and a proportion of technical
provisions (in general 4%)
(idem) CAD: different capital
requirements for position
risk, settlement and
counterparty risk, foreign
exchange risk and 1
quarter of “fixed
overheads” for other risks,
modified in CAD II to take
Value-at-Risk models into
account
Own funds shall never be less
than 13 weeks of “fixed
overheads” (rules on “other
risks”, annex IV of the CAD)
Permissible
activities (non-
exhaustive, only
when related to
asset
management)
Portfolio management,
safekeeping and
administration of
securities, trading in
and underwriting of
securities
Life insurance (including
group insurance)
Non-life insurance (large and
mass risk)
Management and investment
of funded occupational
pension schemes
Individual portfolio
management, securities
brokerage and order
execution activities
Management of investment
funds
Non-core:
- Individual asset management
(including pension funds)
- Investment advice
- Safekeeping (custody) and
administration of UCITSPAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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Asset allocation Holdings in non-
financial institutions
limited to 60% of own
funds, and 15% for a
single holding
Large credit exposures
to single clients are
limited to 800% of own
funds and 25% for a
single exposure
Harmonised minimum rules:
< 10% single holding of real
estate,
< 5% non-listed securities,
< 10% of assets in single,
security, except for public
debt, and < 40% for total large
exposures of blocks of 5%,
< 20% in other currency than
liabilities
Prudent man rule
Member states may set more
stringent rules for
institutions active on their
territory, but within certain
limits
Investment in sponsoring
undertaking are limited to
5% of the technical
provisions
Rules on large exposures < 10% of assets in single
security, except for public
debt, and < 40% for single
investments of 5%,
< 10% non-listed securities,
< 10% of same body for
money market instruments,
and < 20% for investments in
single other funds and
deposits with credit
institutions
Conduct of
business
Host country “general
good” provisions
Host country “general good”
provisions
Host country social and
labour rules
Harmonised CESR
standards, extensive for
retail investors, limited for
professionals
Home country conduct-of-
business rules
Host country advertising and
marketing rules
Disclosure Limited Limited Disclosure of investment
policies, risk and accrued
benefits to fund members
Transparency rules for
regulated markets, post-
trade transparency for
OTC and large blocks
Simplified and full prospectus
(to be updated frequently),
half-yearly and annual report
Investor
compensation
Deposit guarantee
directive
Investor compensation
schemes directive
Investor compensation
schemes (depending upon
national implementation)
Final date for
implementation
1992 1994, 2004 for new solvency
rules
2004(?) 1996 1989 for basic UCITS
directive; August 2003 for
recent amendments
Technical
adaptations
Banking Advisory
Committee (BAC),
limited
Insurance Advisory
Committee (IAC), limited
[Insurance and Pensions
Advisory Committee]
[Securities Committee
under new draft ISD]
UCITS Contact Committee,
but with limited comitology
role40
ANNEX 2
STATISTICS ON FUND MANAGEMENT
Sources: CEA, FEFSI, EFRP.
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Table A1. Evolution of life insurance investments in the EU (billions of euro)
1992 1995 1999 2000 2001
3
B 27.1 35.2 69.1 69.8 73.3
DK 49.6 68.6 115.9 123.1 126.4
D 273.8 373.5 504.7 539.9 572.6
EL n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
E 15.0 30.8 56.3 60.7 69.0
F 198.8 365.8 675.6 743.0 778.7
IRL 11.9 15.8 36.6 39.5 39.5
I 42.0 61.7 156.8 190.2 223.8
L 5.0 19.1 22.0 23.5
NL 98.5 142.7 224.5 231.9 233.7
A 14.2 23.1 31.9 34.5 40.0
P 2.0 5.5 15.5 17.4 20.8
FIN 17.7 27.4 55.1 59.9 38.2
S 56.5 76.2 166.1 174.4 164.9
UK 462.6 578.8 1454.3 1509.6 1502.5
EU-15 
1 1269.8 1810.0 3581.2 3816.1 3906.9
EU-15
2 414.9 536.0 800.3 803.6 862.0
CH 83.7 122.9 182.2 183.8 175.3
1 Total life insurance investments in the EU.
2 Total non-life insurance investments in the EU.
3 Provisional data.
Source. CEA (2002).
Table A2. Growth of life insurance and non-life insurance businesses in the EU
1992 1995 1999 2000 2001
Life insurance 4465.9 5400 8722.4 9083 9232.2
Growth rate n.a. 42.5% 97.9% 6.6% 2.4%
AAGR
1 n.a. 7% 15% n.a. n.a.
Non-life insurance 415 536 800.3 803.6 862.
Growth rate n.a. 29.2% 49.3% 0.4% 7.3%
AAGR n.a. 10% 12% n.a. n.a.
1 Average annual nominal growth rate.PAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
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Table A3. Asset allocation of life insurance companies (%, 2000)
Equity Fixed Income Real Estate Others
B 35.3 59.1 3.0 2.7
DK 42.4 49.8 2.8 5.0
D 36.0 60.5 3.1 0.4
EL 24.5 70.4 5.1 0.0
E 6.7 71.5 4.9 17.0
F 30.3 63.9 4.7 1.1
IRL 56.5 26.1 8.2 9.2
I 19.4 50.1 3.4 27.1
L 44.1 54.3 0.3 1.3
NL 33.4 54.6 5.2 6.8
A 34.0 55.0 7.0 4.0
P 20.4 63.3 5.3 11.0
FIN 36.0 52.9 11.0 0.1
S 51.7 43.0 4.9 0.5
UK 56.8 28.8 5.6 8.9
EU-15 41.9 47.5 4.7 5.9
CH 27.8 57.4 8.8 6.1
Source: CEA (2002).43
ANNEX 3
GLOSSARY OF EU DIRECTIVES & ACRONYMS MENTIONED IN REPORT
EU Directives
Capital adequacy directive (CAD): Council Directive 93/22 of 15 March 1993 on the capital
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, OJ L 141 of 11/06/1993;  Value at Risk
amendments (CAD II): Directive 98/31/EC, Official Journal L 204, 21/07/1998.
Codified directive: Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13
March 2000 on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, OJ L 126 of
26/05/2000 (regroups the key banking directives).
Distance marketing directive: Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 September 2002 concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial
services and amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC,
OJ L 271 of 09/09/2002.
Financial conglomerates directive: Directive 2002/87/EC on the supplementary supervision
of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate,
Official Journal L 035 of 11/02/2003
Investment Services Directive (ISD): Council Directive 93/6 of 10 May 1993 on investment
services in the securities field, OJ L 141 of 11/06/1993; Proposal for a directive of the
European Parliament and the Council on investment services and regulated markets, and
amending Council directives 85/611/EEC and European Parliament and Council Directive
2000/12/EC.
Investor compensation schemes: Directive 97/7/EC of the Council and the European
Parliament on investor compensation schemes, OJ L 84 of 26/03/1997.
Money laundering directive: Council Directive 91/308 of 10 June 1991 on the prevention of
the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, OJ L 166 of 28/06/91.
Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001
amending Council Directive of 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for
the purpose of money laundering, OJ L344 of 28/12/2001.
Pension funds directive: Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision,
Council Common position, 5
th November 2002.
Third life insurance directive: Council Directive 92/96 of 10 November 1992 on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to life insurance and
amending directives 79/267/CEE and 90/619/CEE, OJ L 360 of 9/12/92.
Third non-life insurance directive:  Council Directive 92/49 of 18 June 1992 on the co-
ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct insurance other
than life insurance and amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC, OJ L 228 of
11/08/92.
UCITS I: Council Directive 85/611 on the coordination of laws relating to undertakings for
collective investment in transferable securities, OJ L 375 of 31.12.1985; Council Directive
88/220 amending directive 85/611 relating to undertakings for collective investment in
transferable securities, OJ L 100 of 19/04/1988.
UCITS II (or “product” directive): Directive 2001/108/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 21 January 2002 amending Council Directive 85/611/ECC on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings forPAN-EUROPEAN ASSET MANAGEMENT
44
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), with regard to investments of UCITS,
OJ L41 of 13/02/02.
UCITS III (or “promoter” directive): Directive 2001/107/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 January 2002 amending Council Directive 85/611/ECC on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS), with a view to regulating management
companies and simplified prospectuses, OJ L41 of 13/02/02.
Acronyms
CAD  Capital Adequacy Directive
CBR Conduct-of-Business Rules
CEA Comité Européen des Assurances
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CSD Central Securities Depository
ECJ European Court of Justice
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EET Exempt contributions, Exempt investment income and capital gains of the pension
institution, Taxed benefits
EFC Economic and Financial Committee
EFRP  European Federation of Retirement Provision
ETT  Exempt contributions, Taxed investment income and capital gains of the pension
institution, Taxed Benefits
FEFSI Fédération Européenne des Fonds et Sociétés d’Investissement
IFA  International Fiscal Association
ISD  Investment Services Directive
TEE  Taxed contributions, Exempt income and capital gains of the pension institution,
Exempt benefits
UCITS  Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities45
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